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Information technology (IT) has become imperative to most modern organisations’ 
strategic and operational activities.  It is for this reason that King III clarified the respective 
responsibilities of risk committees, audit committees and internal audit functions with 
respect to IT assurance.  King III recommends the use of technology to improve audit 
coverage and audit efficiency, but does not elaborate on this recommendation.  In this 
research study, a modern audit methodology, namely continuous auditing, was explored 
as a potential solution to address this recommendation made by King III.    
 
Continuous auditing is the ongoing assessment of risks and controls which is enabled by 
technology.  Compared to traditional audit methodologies, continuous auditing is 
considered a cost-effective method to increase audit efficiency and audit coverage.  
Despite the stated benefits of this audit methodology, internal auditors are yet to optimise 
the implementation of continuous auditing in practice.   
 
The primary objective of this research was to develop an audit planning framework for 
internal auditors to implement continuous auditing to ensure ongoing assurance for 
automated IT controls.  The framework consists of strategic planning steps to develop an 
annual audit plan and to identify areas where continuous auditing could be implemented.  
The operational elements of this framework focus only on developing continuous auditing 
for automated IT controls.  The secondary objective was to apply this planning framework 
to compile continuous audit procedures for database management systems, using Oracle 
Database as an example. 
 
The degradation of IT controls is often an early-warning indicator of fraud and error.  The 
implementation of this modern audit methodology for database management systems 
enables internal auditors to report on control deficiencies within a shorter timeframe to 
provide real-time assurance.  Considering that the most valuable information assets are 
retained in databases and in view of the increase in data breach incidents involving high-
profile organisations, the implementation of continuous controls auditing should be a high 
priority for internal audit functions. 
 
 




Inligtingstegnologie (IT) het die middelpunt van die meeste hedendaagse organisasies se 
strategiese en operasionele aktiwiteite geword.  Om hierdie rede het King III die 
onderskeie verantwoordelikhede van risikokomitees, ouditkomitees en interne 
ouditfunksies met betrekking tot gerusstelling vir IT-stelsels uiteengesit.  King III beveel 
aan dat tegnologie gebruik moet word om die effektiwiteit en dekking van oudits te 
verbeter, maar brei nie uit op hierdie aanbeveling nie.  In hierdie studie word ŉ moderne 
ouditmetode, naamlik deurlopende ouditering, ondersoek as ŉ potensiële oplossing vir 
hierdie aanbeveling van King III.   
 
Deurlopende ouditering is die voortdurende assessering van risiko’s en kontroles wat deur 
tegnologie moontlik gemaak word.  In vergelyking met tradisionele ouditmetodes, word 
deurlopende ouditering beskou as ŉ koste-effektiewe metode om oudit-effektiwiteit en 
dekking te verhoog.  Ten spyte van die genoemde voordele van hierdie ouditmetode, het 
interne ouditeure nog nie deurlopende ouditering optimaal in die praktyk geïmplementeer 
nie.   
 
Die primêre doel van hierdie navorsing was om ŉ oudit-beplanningsraamwerk vir interne 
ouditeure te ontwikkel om deurlopende ouditering vir IT-stelsels te implementeer.  Die 
raamwerk bestaan eerstens uit strategiese beplanningstappe om ŉ oorhoofse ouditplan te 
ontwikkel om sodoende areas te identifiseer waar deurlopende ouditering gebruik kan 
word.  Daarna fokus die operasionele elemente van die raamwerk slegs op die 
implementering van deurlopende ouditering vir outomatiese IT-kontroles.  Die sekondêre 
doel van hierdie navorsing was om hierdie beplanningsraamwerk te gebruik om 
deurlopende ouditprosedures vir databasis-bestuurstelsels saam te stel, met Oracle 
Database as voorbeeld.   
 
Die agteruitgang van IT-kontroles is dikwels ŉ vroeë aanduider van bedrog en foute.  Die 
implementering van hierdie moderne ouditmetode vir die ouditering van databasis-
bestuurstelsels stel interne ouditeure binne ŉ korter tyd in staat om verslag te lewer oor 
kontrolegebreke, om sodoende deurlopende gerusstelling te bied.  Aangesien die 
waardevolste inligtingsbates in databasisse gestoor word, en in die lig van die verhoging in 
insidente van datadiefstal by hoëprofiel-organisasies, behoort die implementering van 
deurlopende ouditering ŉ hoë prioriteit vir interne ouditfunksies te wees. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction and background 
 
The King reports on governance principles have formed the basis for good corporate 
governance practices in South African organisations for the past two decades (Goosen, 
2012).  However, information technology (IT) governance was only addressed for the first 
time in the third King report (King III) (Institute of Directors (IODSA), 2009).  The IT 
governance chapter of King III covers the salient aspects of IT governance-related matters 
and also states the responsibilities of the risk committee, audit committee and internal 
audit function with respect to the IT assurance function (IODSA, 2009).     
 
King III states that the risk and audit committees should assist the board of directors in 
carrying out its IT responsibilities (IODSA, 2009).  Risk committees are advised to obtain 
appropriate assurance that IT risks are appropriately governed and that sufficient controls 
are in place to address IT risks (IODSA, 2009).  One of the primary responsibilities of the 
internal audit function is to report to the organisation’s board of directors on IT risk 
assurance matters (IODSA, 2009).  In particular, King III (principle 5.7 paragraph 48) 
recommends that the audit committee should consider using technology and related 
techniques to improve audit coverage and audit efficiency (IODSA, 2009).  In this research 
study, a modern audit methodology, namely continuous auditing, was explored as a 
potential solution to address this recommendation of King III.    
 
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) defines continuous auditing as ongoing risk and 
control assessments which are enabled by technology (IIA, 2015).  Compared to traditional 
audit methodologies, continuous auditing is considered a cost-effective method to increase 
audit efficiency and audit coverage (Whitehouse, 2012).  Traditional auditing techniques 
are often of manual nature and the frequency of audits is limited to annual or bi-annual 
reviews (IIA, 2015).  As a result, material errors, omissions or fraud incidents may not be 
detected until the annual audit is conducted (Chan & Vasarhelyi, 2011).  In comparison, 
continuous auditing is an audit methodology that enables auditors to gather audit evidence 
through the use of a computer on a continuous basis, which may detect irregular instances 
in a timely manner (ISACA, 2016).   
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Although data analysis was mentioned in auditing standards as early as 1978 (Soileau, 
Soileau & Sumners, 2015), industry studies conducted by Protiviti (2015a), the Corporate 
Executive Board (CEB, 2015) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2015) concluded that 
internal auditors have not yet leveraged the benefits of technology-enabled continuous 
auditing techniques in their audit procedures.   
 
 
1.2 Research problem and motivation 
 
Although King III recommends the use of technology to improve audit coverage and 
efficiency, it does not elaborate on this recommendation (IODSA, 2009).  Therefore, this 
research explores continuous audit methodologies as an alternative to traditional audit 
techniques, focusing on the internal audit function’s role to provide assurance on IT risks, 
among other recommendations.   
 
Academics and internal audit practitioners agree that continuous auditing can increase 
audit productivity and efficiency (Chan & Vasarhelyi, 2011).  It also increases audit 
coverage and effectiveness, resulting in increased confidence in the audit procedures 
performed (Soileau et al., 2015).  However, despite the stated benefits, continuous 
auditing remains mostly underutilised by internal audit functions and the implementation of 
this methodology remains on the agenda for internal auditors globally (Deloitte, 2016; 
PwC, 2015; Protiviti, 2015a; CEB, 2015).  In particular, PwC (2013) reported that internal 
audit functions lack the required skill and capacity to utilise technology to perform a more 
effective audit by utilising continuous auditing techniques in an efficient manner, in both 
their audit planning procedures as well as audit fieldwork.   
 
Continuous auditing is therefore considered an emerging research area (Chiu, Liu & 
Vasarhelyi, 2014), with a low adoption rate in practice (PwC, 2015).  Industry studies 
confirmed that the implementation and improvement of continuous auditing initiatives 
continue to be a focus area for internal audit practitioners (Deloitte, 2016; PwC, 2015).  
Current initiatives are mostly immature in nature and include only limited transactional data 
analysis (Protiviti, 2015a).   
 
Continuous auditing methodologies are also applicable to the automated IT system 
controls.  The degradation of IT controls often occurs in advance of the symptomatic errors 
in transactional data and the ongoing assessment of controls enables internal auditors to 
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provide management with an early warning of control deficiencies and violations (IIA, 
2015).  In this manner, internal auditors are enabled to provide assurance on IT risks 
relating to key information assets such as databases.  Considering the absence of readily 
available continuous auditing procedures for automated IT controls, guidance is needed to 
assist internal audit practitioners to implement continuous audit methodologies practically.   
 
Since organisations retain valuable data in databases, database management systems are 
often the target of security breaches (Davis, Schiller & Wheeler, 2011).  Perimeter security 
protection such as firewalls is no longer considered sufficient to protect data assets and 
the focus has shifted to protecting data at the source, i.e. databases (Davis et al., 2011).  
As such, the risks related to the validity and integrity of data should be of concern to audit 
committees and internal audit functions (IODSA, 2009).  
 
However, limited literature is available to guide internal audit functions to implement this 
modern audit methodology as an alternative method to provide assurance for automated 
IT controls, specifically relating database management systems.  Continuous audit 
procedures are therefore developed for database management systems in this study to 
address this gap.   
 
 
1.3 Research objective and scope 
 
The primary objective of this research was to develop an audit planning framework for 
internal auditors to provide assurance through the implementation of continuous audit 
methodologies.  This framework provides guidance for audit planning at a strategic and 
operational level.  The strategic level entails processes to develop an overall audit plan 
and steps to identify areas suited for implementing continuous auditing.  At an operational 
level, one of four elements of continuous auditing, namely continuous control monitoring, is 
further discussed in detail to describe the planning steps to implement ongoing control 
assessments for automated IT controls.  The remaining three elements of continuous 
auditing as defined by Bumgarner and Vasarhelyi (2015), namely continuous data 
auditing, risk monitoring and compliance monitoring, are excluded from this study.  These 
elements consist mainly of transactional data analysis, compared to the continuous 
assessment of automated IT controls (continuous controls monitoring) (Bumgarner & 
Vasarhelyi, 2015), which is the focus of this study.   
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The secondary objective of this research was to apply the above-mentioned planning 
framework to compile a list of continuous audit procedures specifically for Oracle database 
management systems.  Oracle Database was chosen since it was identified in Gartner’s 
2015 magic quadrant report as one of the two leaders for operational database 
management systems (Feinberg, Adrian, Heudecker, Ronthal & Palanca, 2015).  Only the 
controls and procedures relating to the validity, integrity and confidentiality of data are 
included in this research, considering the commercial value of the data retained in 
databases (refer to paragraph 1.2).  The controls that ensure system availability are 
excluded.   
 
This study was limited to the utilisation of generalised audit software which does not 
operate on a truly continuous basis.  Instead, generalised audit software represents batch 
programs that are activated periodically (e.g. daily, weekly or monthly) according to the 
audit objectives and risk assessment (Byrnes, Al-Awahdi, Gullvist, Brown-Liburd, Teeter, 
Warren & Vasarhelyi, 2015b).  Alternative approaches that may in future provide true 
continuous auditing solutions include the following:   
 Embedded audit modules (EAM) that involve the installation of coded segments 
within the host system to provide an integrate test facility;  
 Monitoring and controls layer (MCL) architecture, which is a middleware solution that 
extracts data from disparate systems for further analysis; 
 An audit data warehouse model that entails extracting and transforming data in real 
time and is made available in audit-specific data marts (Byrnes et al., 2015b).   
However, due to the various concerns noted with each of the above approaches, Byrnes et 
al. (2015b) observed that the above-mentioned alternatives still remain as academic topics 
only.  Concerns include the high implementation cost, potential impairment of auditor 
independence and challenges in securing the data and logs from manipulation by IT staff 
(Byrnes et al., 2015b).  Therefore, the audit planning framework and audit procedures in 
this study was developed considering the capabilities of generalised audit software.    
 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
 
The research problem was addressed by conducting a non-empirical study of existing 
literature from accredited academic articles in international journals, electronic sources, 
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White Papers, theses and academic text books.  Where applicable, auditing standards 
published by the IIA and ISACA (previously known as the Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association) were also consulted.  Technical resources included the best practice 
standards published by software companies such as Oracle and the security benchmarks 
published by the Centre for Internet Security (CIS).  The following aspects were 
researched:   
 The definition and scope of continuous auditing and related topics; 
 Historical literature that demonstrates the importance of continuous auditing and the 
perceived underutilisation for this modern audit methodology;  
 Implementation guidance to change audit procedures from traditional auditing to 
continuous auditing techniques; 
 Auditing procedures relevant to database management systems, including 
configuration controls which can be audited using computer-assisted audit tools and 
techniques (CAATTs).    
 
Based on the literature review, it was possible to develop an audit planning framework in 
order to implement continuous auditing processes, which was then applied to develop 
continuous audit procedures for the Oracle database management system.  A three-step 
approach was followed:    
 
Step 1: Continuous auditing was defined and distinguished from traditional auditing 
methodologies in Chapter 3. 
 
Step 2: A framework was developed to provide guidance to internal auditors when 
planning the implementation of continuous auditing techniques.  The framework 
entails four levels of detail, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 Level I:  A continuous auditing implementation strategy is developed which is 
embedded in the strategic audit plan and the resulting annual audit plan.  
 Level II:  The implementation strategy is further refined by performing a risk and 
control assessment for selected business processes which forms the foundation 
for developing detailed continuous audit procedures.   
 Level III:  At an operational level, the different IT access paths of a particular 
business process are analysed to ensure that all the underlying IT architectural 
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components are identified.  A risk and control assessment is conducted for each 
component.   
 Level IV:  Detailed continuous auditing procedures are developed for the particular 
access path component under review.  The continuous audit procedures are 
determined by considering the lifecycle phase of the product’s development and 
the risks and controls relating to the process and component under review.  
Baseline standards are developed for key controls to be tested continuously, using 
automated tools.  The specific tools to automate the process, such as generalised 
audit software, are selected at this stage.   
 
Step 3: Using the framework developed in step 2, practical continuous auditing procedures 
were then developed for one access path component, namely database 
management systems, as discussed in Chapter 5.  Oracle Database was used as 
an example.  This was done by firstly describing the risks and controls for each 
control area, as well as the relating traditional and continuous audit procedures for 
each identified control area.  The continuous auditing procedures were then tabled 
for each lifecycle phase, where applicable.  These continuous auditing procedures 
were developed considering the capabilities of generalised audit software.  
 
 
1.5 Organisation of the research  
 
The thesis consists of the following chapters:  
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction.  Following an introduction, the research problem and motivation 
and research methodology are discussed. 
 
Chapter 2:  Historical research.  A historical literature review demonstrates the emerging 
nature of continuous auditing as a research area for various interested stakeholders.  In 
this chapter, the development of continuous auditing as an academic topic is summarised, 
together with the adoption of this audit methodology by internal audit functions.  
Considering the low adoption rate observed in practice, the guidance on this topic offered 
by accounting and auditing associations is also evaluated together with available technical 
literature developed by inter alia software companies.  It is concluded in this chapter that 
detailed guidance have not yet been documented for the implementation of continuous 
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audit procedures for automated IT controls, specifically for database management 
systems.    
 
Chapter 3:  Literature review:  Definition and scope of continuous auditing.  A 
literature review clarifies the definition and scope of continuous auditing, in comparison 
with related terminology such as data analysis and continuous monitoring.  The evolution 
of data analytics to continuous auditing and, ultimately, to continuous assurance is 
demonstrated in this chapter.   
 
Chapter 4:  Findings:  Audit planning framework at a strategic and operational level 
for implementing continuous auditing.  A generic audit planning framework is 
developed at a strategic and operational level to guide internal audit practitioners when 
implementing the continuous auditing methodology.  The focus is on one element of 
continuous auditing, namely continuous controls monitoring of automated IT controls.  The 
planning steps are summarised in the framework consisting of four levels.   
 
Chapter 5:  Findings:  Continuous auditing procedures for Oracle database 
management systems.  A literature review is performed to identify the risks and controls 
relevant to database management systems, using Oracle Database as an example.  A 
practical implementation guide is developed listing the continuous audit procedures for 
each control area, considering the different phases of the product’s lifecycle, relating 
specifically to Oracle Database.   
 
Chapter 6:  Conclusion.  An overview of the research, highlighting the outcomes of the 
research, is provided in this chapter.  Areas relating to this topic that remain available for 
future research are also identified.   
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Continuous auditing is considered an emerging research area (Chiu et al., 2014) for 
various stakeholders.  In particular, the majority of academic contributions have so far 
focused on the consequences and benefits of continuous auditing as well as on certain 
technical aspects, such as the architectural design aspects, of implementing continuous 
auditing technologies (Chiu et al., 2014).  In recognition of the benefits of this audit 
methodology, accounting and auditing associations have also invested in developing 
guidance on continuous auditing (AICPA, 2015; IIA, 2015; ISACA, 2010).  This guidance is 
however introductory in nature and offers mainly strategic implementation guidance, 
without detailing continuous auditing procedures at an operational level for any particular 
IT architecture component.  Despite the repeated optimism demonstrated by internal audit 
practitioner surveys, it appears as if the implementation of this audit methodology has 
however advanced very slowly in practice (Gonzalez, Sharma & Galletta, 2012).   
 
 
2.2 Industry studies 
 
The emerging nature and low adoption rate of continuous auditing in practice was 
confirmed by industry studies published by audit and consulting firms in 2015 and 2016, as 
illustrated below.  These studies researched internal audit functions worldwide and are 
conducted periodically to identify focus areas and opportunities for enhancement of audit 
capabilities.   
 
 Continuous auditing and CAATTs, combined with data mining and data analysis 
tools, remained on the agenda for internal audit leaders since 2013, according to 
Protiviti’s annual 2015 Internal Audit Capabilities and Needs Survey with more than 
800 correspondents (Protiviti, 2015a).  A follow-up survey, focusing on data analytics 
and continuous auditing, found that internal audit functions consider data analytics as 
a high priority and that there are significant opportunities to expand continuous 
auditing initiatives (Protiviti, 2015b).  Both studies provided recommendations for 
internal audit functions to improve their analytical capabilities. 
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 Similarly, the CEB 2015 Audit Department Challenges and Priorities survey, involving 
more than 100 internal audit functions, confirmed that the implementation and 
improvement of data analytics are the most significant priorities for internal audit 
functions.  The advancement of data analytics capabilities were noted as either a 
high or very high priority for 2015 by 52% of respondents, while 35% rated this as a 
moderate priority (CEB, 2015).   
 PwC (2013) reported that internal audit functions lacked the necessary skill and 
capacity to utilise technology to perform a more effective audit.  Less than a third of 
the respondents indicated that they were using data analytics on a regular basis (Le 
Roux & Wallis, 2014; PwC, 2013).  Although limited improvement was noted in 2015, 
data analysis was identified as one of four focus areas for internal audit functions 
(PwC, 2015).  PwC’s 2015 State of the Internal Audit Profession study, involving 
more than 1 300 chief audit executives, revealed that most internal audit functions 
are still considering how data analytics can be leveraged more efficiently and 
effectively.  Most functions are experimenting with expanding the use of data analysis 
(PwC, 2015).  While 82% of chief audit executives indicated that data analytics are 
used in specific audits, 48% use analytics for scoping decisions and 43% leverage 
data as part of risk assessments (PwC, 2015).  It can be concluded that data analysis 
is not yet embedded throughout all audit processes, including annual planning, 
engagement planning and audit field work, while continuous auditing is still in an 
immature state in practice (PwC, 2015).   
 Deloitte (2016) reported similar findings in their global survey involving approximately 
1 200 chief audit executives.  It was found that 86% of respondents use data 
analytics, but only 24% rated its usage at an intermediate level and 7% at an 
advanced level.  The primary area of usage was audit field work (66%), followed by 
engagement planning (36%) and annual planning (32%) (Deloitte, 2016).   
 AuditNet’s 2012 survey report on data analysis software concluded that internal 
auditors were using data analysis software mainly on an ad hoc basis (AuditNet, 
2012).  A follow-up survey conducted in 2015 indicated that 60% of the respondents 
have purchased analytical software.  However, only 24% of the respondents 
indicated that they always use data analysis to develop the annual audit plan, while 
68% included data analysis in audit fieldwork, only on an ad hoc basis (AuditNet, 
2015).   
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 The strategic importance of both data analysis and continuous auditing was 
confirmed in the IIA’s 2015 Common Body of Knowledge (CBOK) survey involving 
14 500 internal audit practitioners (IIA Research Foundation, 2015).  Compared to 
CBOK 2006, CBOK 2015 shows a 14% increase in the use of technology tools, 
particularly in the use of data mining (IIA Research Foundation, 2015).  Currently, 
53% of respondents are moderately or extensively involved in data mining (Cangemi, 
2016).  However, continuous auditing is one of the least used technology techniques 
indicated in the 2015 survey and is used extensively by only 14% of respondents, 
with a 7% increase observed from 2006 (Cangemi, 2016).   
 
It is evident from the above industry studies that internal audit practitioners have not yet 
optimised the use of data analytics, which is a precursor for continuous auditing.  Current 
initiatives are mostly limited to transactional analytics and have not necessarily evolved to 
the continuous assessment of automated controls.  The low adoption rate of this modern 
audit methodology observed by industry studies, was also confirmed in academic 
research.   
 
 
2.3 Academic research 
 
The concept of continuous auditing first transpired in academic research in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  Vasarhelyi (1983) is considered the first academic to commence with 
researching opportunities to implement technology to aid the execution of audit tasks.  
Initial research included examining the evolution of automated audit processes (Chiu et al., 
2014).  Computerised audit implementations only reflected the computerisation of manual 
methods rather than the re-engineering of associated audit processes (Vasarhelyi, 1984). 
Since the 1980s, more researchers demonstrated the potential of “closer to the event” 
assurance processes, namely continuous auditing (Groomer & Murthy, 1989; Vasarhelyi & 
Halper, 1991).  Authors have questioned the timeliness, efficiency and appropriateness of 
traditional audit procedures, where financial statements are audited months after the 
occurrence of the actual business activities (Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015)  
 
An increase in academic interest in continuous auditing was noted from 2001 (Chiu et al., 
2014).  Academic studies conducted between 2000 and 2014 further emphasised the need 
for continuous auditing by evaluating the methodology, costs, benefits and enabling 
technologies (Chiu et al., 2014).  In this period, research extended to case studies which 
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analyse the utilisation of this audit methodology in practice, including analyses of the 
enabling technologies (Chiu et al., 2014).  The main focus areas were financial statement 
and transactional analysis (Byrnes, Ames, Vasarhelyi, Pawlicki & McQuilken, 2015a; Alles, 
Kogan & Vasarhelyi, 2011).     
 
Academics also commenced with developing frameworks to assist audit practitioners in 
transforming the traditional manual audit processes to an automated process and 
potentially real-time reporting (Flowerday, Blundell & Von Solms, 2006).  Continuous 
monitoring and continuous assurance studies were also conducted in this period (Alles, 
Brennan, Kogan, & Vasarhelyi, 2006).   
 
The idea of continuous auditing was initially conceptualised as a transaction monitoring 
and trend analysis function, which could be enhanced with an exception reporting facility 
(Alles et al., 2006).  The focus was on the analysis of transactions underlying the annual 
financial statements, with little mention of the automation of the audit procedures for 
automated IT controls (Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015).  The continuous audit concept 
was however expanded to also provide assurance over the adequacy of internal controls 
(including IT configuration controls) as a response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015).   
 
Later studies focused on continuous auditing of automated IT controls.  Alles et al. (2006) 
studied a methodology where auditors are alerted of any changes to configuration settings 
of an enterprise resource planning (ERP) system which is compared to a baseline 
standard of configuration settings.  The original work of Alles et al. (2006) was 
subsequently extended to a wider set of controls and parameters (Teeter, 2014).  Audit 
automation, remote auditing and continuous auditing were joined in a framework to assist 
auditors in identifying opportunities for audit innovation (Teeter, 2014).    
 
Chiu et al. (2014) concluded that continuous auditing can be considered an emerging 
research area, with architectural issues, such as technical implementation challenges 
relating to continuous auditing, being the most prevalent subject matter, followed by 
studies focusing on the consequences of implementing the continuous auditing 
techniques.  Despite the increased academic interest in continuous auditing noted since 
2000 (Chiu et al., 2014), organisations are not yet reaping the benefits of this advanced 
audit methodology (Byrnes et al., 2015a).  It is therefore not surprising that accounting and 
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auditing associations continue to invest in continuous auditing guidance and studies, still 




2.4 Professional accounting and auditing associations 
 
The first guidance on continuous auditing by accounting and auditing associations was 
jointly published in 1999 by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) and 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (CICA & AICPA, 1999).  
This publication was superseded in 2015 by a compendium of academic essays which 
provide an overview of continuous audit theory and practice (AICPA, 2015).  
 
Following CICA & AICPA (1999), the IIA Research Foundation published a research report 
in 2003 that explained the concept and benefits of continuous auditing and also provided 
practical implementation guidance (Warren & Parker, 2003).  The IIA research report was 
complemented in 2005 by the IIA’s GTAG 3 Continuous Auditing: Implications for 
Assurance (IIA, 2005).  The second edition of GTAG 3 was published in 2015.  This 
guidance consists of foundational and optimised continuous auditing assurance 
frameworks and includes updated practical applications for continuous auditing (IIA, 2015).  
The guidance focuses on planning steps for implementing continuous auditing techniques 
and includes high-level planning steps for both continuous transactional and controls 
auditing.  Although IIA (2015) addresses strategic and operational planning steps, the 
guidance relating to continuous control monitoring is at an introductory level.  In particular, 
at an operational level, implementation guidance does not extend to any particular IT 
architecture component.   
 
ISACA also published guidance on continuous auditing in 2010, titled G42 IT Audit and 
Assurance Guidelines:  Continuous Assurance (ISACA, 2010).  These guidelines are 
based on the IIA’s GTAG 3 and are therefore also limited to high-level implementation 
guidance only.  The guidance does not extend to continuous auditing procedures for 
automated IT controls, but is limited to generic planning steps for transactional auditing 
only (ISACA, 2010).   
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Similar to AICPA (2015), the Australian Institute of Chartered Accountants published a 
White Paper in 2010, which defines continuous auditing and provides limited 
implementation guidance and introductory examples (Vasarhelyi, Alles & Williams, 2010).   
 
Considering the updated guidance published in 2015 by both the IIA and AICPA, it is 
evident that continuous auditing remains an emerging and relevant topic for professional 
accounting and auditing associations.  However, the above-mentioned documents contain 
only high-level implementation guidance which is mainly strategic in nature.  On an 
operational level, the guidance focuses on transactional data analysis and do not extend to 
detailed guidance for continuous control monitoring of automated IT controls.  In particular, 
the available guidance does not extend to any specific IT architectural component, such as 
database management systems, as is the objective of this study.   
 
 
2.5 Technical literature  
 
The abovementioned literature on continuous auditing does not include detailed guidance 
or auditing procedures for any particular IT architecture component, such as database 
management systems.  There is a variety of technical literature covering the security and 
configuration of specific software installations, such as software-specific security 
benchmarks (CIS, 2015), security handbooks (Wright, 2014) and implementation guidance 
by software vendors (Huey, 2016) which focuses on Oracle Database only.  However, 
these publications focus on the system configuration to be applied by IT management and 
are not intended to serve as practical continuous auditing procedures.   
 
Furthermore, audit-specific literature focusing on database management systems is 
limited.  Most notable is ISACA (2009) that details security and audit guidance specific to 
Oracle Database.  However, the audit procedures documented by ISACA (2009) are 
limited to traditional audit procedures for older versions of Oracle Database.  To address 
the perceived underutilisation of automated audit procedures for database management 
systems, Cooke (2014) proposed that database management systems could be audited 
using computer assisted audit tools and techniques (CAATTs).  The concept was 
demonstrated for limited configuration settings (mainly user account management) for 
Oracle Database (Cooke, 2014).  This study was followed by a similar high-level article 
focusing on SQL Server (Cooke, 2015).  The audit methodology proposed by Cooke 
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(2014) was utilised in this study to develop detailed continuous audit procedures for 
database management systems.  In particular, the work of Cooke (2014) is extended in 
this study to include a broader set of controls for Oracle Database and the related audit 





It can be concluded from the above studies that, although internal audit practitioners 
recognise the value of data analysis and continuous auditing, the implementation of this 
methodology remains low in practice.  Continuous auditing and its precursor, data 
analytics, have remained emerging topics for internal auditors (PwC, 2015).   
 
The underutilisation of this modern auditing methodology in practice (PwC, 2015) may be 
attributed to the lacking guidance for inter alia the continuous control monitoring of 
automated IT controls.  Although standards and guides developed by professional 
associations address strategic and operational planning steps to implement continuous 
auditing, the guidance focuses on continuous auditing using transactional data, while the 
guidance relating to the continuous assessment of automated controls is at a strategic 
level.   
 
Furthermore, academic field studies of this methodology focused on continuous data 
(transactional) auditing, with limited inclusion of continuous auditing procedures relating to 
automated IT controls.  In particular, literature in this area is limited to specific software 
applications only, mostly related to ERP systems.  Limited audit-specific literature relating 
to Oracle database management systems was found. 
 
Therefore, a detailed audit planning framework was developed in this study to guide the 
implementation of continuous auditing procedures.  The framework includes planning 
steps at both a strategic and operational level.  At an operational level, only those planning 
step relevant to the continuous assessment of automated IT controls are included.  This 
planning framework is then applied by developing detailed continuous auditing procedures 
for Oracle database management systems.     
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King III recommends that audit committees should consider the use of technology to 
improve audit coverage and efficiency (IODSA, 2009).  Continuous auditing is considered 
a cost-effective method to increase such audit coverage and efficiency requirements and 
is noted as an alternative methodology to traditional audit methodologies (IIA, 2015).   
 
Continuous auditing is attracting increased attention in the internal auditing environment, 
as discussed in Chapter 2.  Although many benefits, including improved efficiencies, have 
been noted in studies since 1983, internal auditors globally have not yet fully leveraged the 
benefits of this alternative audit methodology (Byrnes et al., 2015a).  While continuous 
auditing is utilised mostly for analysing transactional data, this methodology could be also 
be used to provide assurance relating to automated IT controls relating to IT architecture 
components such as operating systems, databases and software applications (IIA, 2015).   
 
The terms continuous auditing, continuous monitoring and continuous assurance 
are however often incorrectly used interchangeably:   
 Continuous auditing refers to the ongoing assessment of risks and controls by 
internal auditors, which is achieved through automated audit processes (refer to 
paragraph 3.2) (IIA, 2015).   
 Continuous monitoring includes management’s processes which assess the 
adequacy of controls and includes those processes that ensure policies are operating 
effectively.  Continuous monitoring is performed by financial, operational and IT 
management (refer to paragraph 3.8) (IIA, 2015).  
 Continuous assurance is the result of harmonised continuous auditing techniques 
and continuous monitoring processes, which is mainly achieved through automation 
of procedures (refer to paragraph 3.9) (Roth, 2012).   
 
This study focuses on the continuous auditing procedures that could be implemented by 
internal audit functions.  Although procedures may be similar in nature to the continuous 
monitoring activities conducted by management, internal audit’s assurance activities 
should be conducted independently from management to provide independent assurance 
to the audit committee (IIA, 2015).  
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3.2 Continuous auditing definition 
 
The IIA (2015) defines continuous auditing as ongoing risk and control assessments which 
are enabled by technology.  Similarly, ISACA (2016) describes continuous auditing as an 
approach which enables auditors to monitor system reliability and gather selective audit 
evidence through the use of a computer on a continuous basis.   
 
Continuous auditing is designed to enable internal auditors to report audit results in a 
shorter timeframe compared to the traditional retrospective audit approach (IIA, 2015).  
Continuous audit procedures are dependent on defined processes and enabling 
technologies (IIA, 2015; Roth, 2012) and could entail any method used by auditors to 
perform audit-related activities on a continuous basis, ranging from continuous controls 
assessment to continuous risk assessments (IIA, 2011).   
 
Although continuous auditing could potentially be conducted in real time, the frequency of 
analysis is determined by the level of risk, the business cycle and the extent and frequency 
of management’s monitoring controls (IIA, 2015).  The frequency of transaction exception 
reporting may coincide with the financial reporting cycle, such as on a monthly or annual 
basis (IIA, 2015).   
 
Continuous auditing is not limited to transactional analysis only, but may also extend to IT 
systems, including automated controls and operational IT processes (IIA, 2015).  Also, at 
an operational level, security event monitoring may be conducted in real time for analysis 
and follow-up as these events occur (Hargenrader, 2015).  Since changes to automated or 
configured controls are typically infrequent, continuous auditing procedures may rather be 
synchronised with the routine software release and upgrade cycles managed by the 
organisation’s IT department (IIA, 2015).   
 
To enable real-time auditing, technology plays a key role in automating the continuous 
audit process.  These tools are used for the identification of exceptions, trend analysis, 
detailed transaction analysis, comparisons against thresholds, testing of controls and the 
comparison of a process or system over time (IIA, 2011).    
 
The four elements of continuous data auditing, control monitoring, risk monitoring and 
compliance monitoring are discussed further in paragraph 3.7.   
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3.3 The value of continuous auditing 
 
Academics and internal audit practitioners have identified a range of benefits originating 
from continuous auditing, as discussed below.   
 Continuous auditing enables auditors to report on a subject matter within a shorter 
timeframe, potentially in real time or instantaneously (Soileau et al., 2015; ISACA 
Standards Board, 2002).  This could result in more timely (or real-time) risk 
assurance processes (Chan & Vasarhelyi, 2011).  Auditors can therefore actively 
detect and investigate exceptions as they occur, compared to traditional (annual) 
auditing processes, which typically detect exceptions long after the actual occurrence 
thereof (Chan & Vasarhelyi, 2011).  
 In addition to transactional analysis, continuous auditing can also be deployed to 
detect control weaknesses relating to IT systems, thereby enabling the timely 
remediation by management (IIA, 2015).  
 Data analysis technology has enabled auditors to improve the efficiency of audits 
through the automation of processes (Roth, 2012).  Audit functions have also been 
able to broaden the scope of assurance activities through the automation of 
analytical procedures, without noting an associated increase in the number of audit 
staff (Roth, 2012).  It has also enabled remote auditing of distributed processes, 
thereby reducing the travelling costs to remote locations (Teeter, 2014). 
 Audit coverage and effectiveness are increased since continuous auditing typically 
covers the entire transaction population using data analysis (IIA, 2015). 
 Data analysis technologies enable auditors to access data independently as they are 
no longer reliant on the organisation’s personnel to extract data.  This reduces the 
opportunity for data manipulation and increases the confidence in the accuracy and 
completeness of the data being analysed (IIA, 2011).   
 
These benefits have been realised mostly by internal auditors, as discussed in paragraph 
3.4 below.   
 
 
3.4 External versus internal audit   
 
Although international accounting and auditing professional bodies have published 
guidance on continuous auditing, this methodology is primarily used by internal auditors 
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(Gonzalez et al., 2012).  The original development of continuous auditing was aimed at 
replacing the annual external audit processes.  However, external audit firms primarily do 
not use continuous audit techniques, but rather consult with internal audit functions on this 
matter (Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015).   
 
The most prevalent consideration for external auditors is the high implementation cost, 
compared to the lengthy return period and the short-term nature of external audit 
engagements (Byrnes et al., 2015a).  Many businesses are also reluctant to grant external 
parties ongoing access to their systems (Byrnes et al., 2015a).  However, external auditors 
may still leverage the benefits of continuous auditing by relying on the work of internal 
auditors to provide audit evidence (Teeter, 2014).  External audit firms also benefit when 
they provide outsourced internal audit services (Byrnes et al., 2015a). 
 
Even though there were no corresponding increases in the external audit environment, 
Byrnes et al., (2015a) concluded that noteworthy gains were made by internal auditors in 
this field.  However, industry studies, as discussed in paragraph 2.2, confirm that the 




3.5 Comparison of traditional and continuous auditing methodologies 
 
Advances in accounting information systems, particularly ERP systems, have enabled 
real-time financial reporting (Chan & Vasarhelyi, 2011).  Traditional audit methodologies 
have however not necessarily developed parallel to such real-time technology and 
economic environments (Chan & Vasarhelyi, 2011).  Due to the manual nature of 
traditional audit procedures, such as the review of manual reconciliations, sampling and 
manual document verification, the frequency of audits is often limited to annual or bi-
annual internal audit reviews.  As a result, material errors may not be detected until the 
periodic (e.g. annual) internal audit is conducted (IIA, 2015).  However, management and 
stakeholder reliance on real-time financial information is dependent on real-time assurance 
(Byrnes et al., 2015a).  In the absence of real-time assurance, adverse management 
decisions could be made when using unaudited information.  Therefore, the traditional 
audit process should be amended to support real-time assurance.  Continuous auditing 
can be considered as a pro-active rather than a reactive audit methodology and is 
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therefore considered to be a successor of the traditional audit strategies (Chan & 
Vasarhelyi, 2011).  
 
The most notable difference between traditional auditing and continuous auditing is the 
level of automation of audit procedures.  Although data analyses may be utilised in 
traditional auditing, these analytical procedures are ad hoc in nature and not necessarily 
automated, as discussed in paragraph 3.6 (Chan & Vasarhelyi, 2011).  Traditional and 
continuous auditing methodologies are compared in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1  Comparison of traditional and continuous auditing methodologies 
 
 Traditional Auditing Continuous Auditing 
Frequency of testing 
and reporting  
Periodic, e.g. annual Real-time or frequent, e.g. weekly 
Approach Reactive  Pro-active 
Procedure Manual Automated 
Role of auditor 
The majority of the audit work 
consists of time- and labour-
intensive audit procedures 
Consists of the investigation of 
exceptions and procedures 
requiring human judgement 
Nature  
Audit procedures mostly consist of 
analytical review procedures and 
substantive testing  
Testing consists of continuous 
control monitoring and continuous 
data assurance 
Timing 
Controls testing and detailed 
testing occur separately 
Controls monitoring and detailed 
testing occur simultaneously 
Extent 
Sampling is used extensively in 
testing transactions 
Whole population is subject to 
testing 
Resource Manual execution of testing 
Data modelling and analytics are 
used for monitoring and testing 
 
(Source:  Chan & Vasarhelyi, 2011)  
 
 
3.6 The relationship between data analysis and continuous auditing 
 
The effective use of data analysis is a precursor to implementing technology-enabled 
continuous auditing methodologies (IIA, 2011).  Data analytics involves processes 
designed to obtain and evaluate data to extract and derive information for further use (IIA, 
2011).   
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Data analysis as used by auditors refers to the process of identifying, gathering, validating, 
analysing and interpreting various forms of data (IIA, 2011).  When data analysis is 
conducted, the overall objective and scope of an audit does not change.  Data analysis is 
merely an alternative method to manual procedures which can be used to achieve the 
audit objectives (IIA, 2011).  The results of data analytics may be used to identify areas of 
key risk, fraud, errors or misuse, improve business efficiencies, verify process 
effectiveness and influence business decisions (ISACA, 2011).   
 
Technology-based audit tools which could be utilised for data analysis includes 
generalised audit software, spreadsheet software or scripts developed using audit-specific 
software, specialised audit utilities, commercially packaged solutions and custom-
developed production systems (IIA, 2015).  These audit tools form the foundation for 
continuous auditing.  Technology-based audit tools are discussed further in paragraph 
4.5.3. 
 
Although data analysis is considered a precursor for continuous auditing (IIA, 2011), the 
implementation of data analysis technologies does not imply that continuous auditing is 
also implemented.  Considering the activity-based maturity assessment discussed in 
paragraph 4.2.4, the initial phases of data analytics, namely ad hoc analytics, applied 
analytics and managed analytics, are not considered to be continuous auditing until a high 
degree of automation is achieved (KPMG, 2013), as explained below.   
 Ad hoc analytics is the least mature level and is characterised by the basic use of 
analysis tools.  Analytics are typically descriptive in nature and are limited to 
statistical analysis, classifications or summarisation of data.  Ad hoc analytics are 
difficult to repeat in the absence of a standard methodology and documentation (IIA, 
2011).   
 The applied analytics level is characterised by integrating analytics into the audit 
processes (ISACA, 2011).  Analytics are mainly used during audit fieldwork.  It may 
also be used in the development of the audit plan, e.g. identifying financial statement 
trends (KPMG, 2013). 
 The managed analytics level presents a controlled approach.  Data, audit 
procedures and results are typically retained centrally, while standards for analytical 
procedure development are documented and analytical applications are executed 
against centralised data (IIA, 2011; ISACA, 2011).   
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 At the automated analytics level, protocols have been implemented for the 
automation of analytical procedures (IIA, 2011).  Analytical procedures are 
considered repeatable at this level as the analytics logic is captured within program 
scripts (IIA, 2011; ISACA, 2011).  Automated analytics is the first level of maturity that 
can be classified as continuous auditing (KPMG, 2013). 
 
 
3.7 The elements of continuous auditing 
 
Continuous auditing is broadly defined as the ongoing assessment of risks and controls 
which is achieved through automation, as discussed in paragraph 3.2 (Bumgarner & 
Vasarhelyi, 2015).  Bumgarner and Vasarhelyi (2015) have however clarified this definition 
of continuous auditing by differentiating between four elements (refer to Figure 3.1).  
These elements are discussed in the remainder of this section.   
 




(Source:  Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015) 
 
3.7.1 Continuous data auditing 
 
Internal auditors are faced with an expanding scope of activities while resources often 
remain limited (Soileau et al., 2015).  This has contributed to the increased use of ad hoc 
transactional analytics as part of the traditional auditing methodology (Soileau et al., 2015).  
Examples of transactional analysis, which can be conducted continuously include: 
 Extracting purchase transactions exceeding authorised limits;  
 Summarising credit card transactions to identify excessive usage; and 
 Comparison of account balances to the previous year (IIA, 2015). 
 
The first implementations of continuous auditing were initially limited to the ongoing 
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1991).  The initial concept of continuous auditing, i.e. transactional analysis and exception 
reporting, is now rather classified as continuous data auditing (Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 
2015).   
 
3.7.2 Continuous control monitoring  
 
The initial scope of continuous (data) auditing was subsequently expanded to assurance 
on the adequacy of controls, in addition to only conducting transactional analysis (Alles et 
al., 2006).  Although similarly named, this element of continuous auditing should not be 
confused with the continuous monitoring activities of management (refer to paragraph 3.8).   
 
Bumgarner and Vasarhelyi (2015) defined this element as continuous control 
monitoring.  Alles et al. (2006) examined an audit approach which was developed in 
response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  Typical continuous control monitoring 
evaluates configurable controls against a baseline standard to identify any subsequent 
changes for further evaluation (IIA, 2015).  Teeter (2014) extended this original work by 
examining a larger set of configurable controls of an ERP system.  Configurable controls 
could include IT general controls, automated application controls, program changes and 
security parameters (IIA, 2015).   
 
Examples of continuous control monitoring by internal audit functions include (IIA, 2015):  
 Evaluating application configuration changes by comparing the current configuration 
setting to a baseline standard;   
 Identifying program and parameter changes for further evaluation;   
 Scanning operating systems for patch levels; and 
 Analysing incident and error management systems for risk indicators. 
 
An audit planning framework to implement this element of continuous auditing, together 
with practical continuous audit (control monitoring) procedures for database management 
systems, is the focus of this study.  
 
3.7.3 Continuous risk monitoring 
 
Vasarhelyi et al. (2010) suggested the addition of continuous risk monitoring to the 
continuous auditing schema.  Internal audit functions judgementally select risks for 
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monitoring against key risk indicators to detect significant changes in risk.  These 
monitoring activities should be automated, similar to the other elements of continuous 
auditing.  Any increases or changes in the risk indicators are considered for inclusion in 
the audit plan, or alternatively, communicated to management (IIA, 2015).  For example, 
an increase in IT security incidents could be a leading indicator of a system compromise 
(Byrnes, Brennan, Vasarhelyi & Moon, 2015c).    
 
3.7.4 Continuous compliance monitoring 
 
In response to the increase in legal and regulatory compliance requirements of the modern 
business world, Bumgarner and Vasarhelyi (2015) propose that continuous compliance 
monitoring be added as the fourth element of continuous auditing.  Continuous data, 
controls and risk monitoring are complementary to continuous compliance monitoring and 
may have shared design, analytical and technology components (Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 
2015).       
 
 
3.8 Continuous monitoring 
 
Continuous monitoring is a process performed by management to monitor on an ongoing 
basis whether internal controls are operating effectively (IIA, 2015).  Many of the 
techniques employed by management to monitor controls continuously are similar to 
continuous auditing techniques used by internal auditors (IIA, 2015).   
 
Continuous monitoring allows an organisation to observe one or many processes, systems 
or types of data.  Similar to executive information systems, continuous monitoring systems 
are designed to generate summary information such as daily sales volumes and billing.  
Other examples are the monitoring of accounts payable and cash disbursement activities, 
including identifying duplicate transactions by comparing reference numbers, account 
numbers and amounts (ISACA Standards Board, 2002).  
 
There is an inverse relationship between continuous auditing and continuous monitoring 
performed by management, as depicted in Figure 3.2.  Internal auditors should adjust the 
extent of continuous auditing work based on the adequacy of management’s continuous 
monitoring processes.  Should the continuous monitoring process be inadequate, auditing 
efforts should increase accordingly (IIA, 2015).  
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(Source:  IIA, 2015) 
 
Since continuous monitoring procedures performed by management are often similar to 
those continuous auditing procedures performed by internal auditors, internal auditors 
should ensure that they do not retain ownership for continuous monitoring activities as this 
could be presumed to impair the independence of the auditor (IIA, 2015).   
 
Auditing standards (e.g. IIA Practice Advisory 2320-4, ISACA Standard 1002-3) state that 
the monitoring of processes, systems and data forms part of management’s responsibility 
to implement and maintain an effective control environment (ISACA, 2014; IIA, 2013a).  
Therefore, internal audit functions should refrain from assuming a monitoring role under 
the auspices of continuous auditing (ISACA Standards Board, 2002).  
 
Information provided by a continuous monitoring system can provide internal auditors with 
information about a process, system or data (ISACA Standards Board, 2002).  The internal 
auditor's objective is to accumulate independent audit evidence to reduce the audit risk to 
an appropriate level (ISACA Standards Board, 2002).  Due to the indirect nature of 
information provided by a continuous monitoring system, this information cannot be utilised 
as audit evidence without corroborating the information with directly obtained evidence 
(ISACA Standards Board, 2002).  Additional independent procedures are therefore 
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3.9 Continuous assurance 
 
Continuous assurance is a combination of the internal auditor’s continuous auditing 
processes and audit testing of continuous monitoring activities performed by financial, 
operational and IT management, as depicted in Figure 3.3 (Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 
2015).  The auditor should examine the adequacy of management’s continuous monitoring 
activities to determine whether the auditor can reduce the detailed testing of controls (IIA, 
2013a; KPMG, 2013).   
 




(Source:  Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015) 
 
As continuous auditing aims to establish whether policies and controls are operating 
effectively, audit procedures are also extended to the continuous monitoring processes 





The term continuous auditing is often used interchangeably with related concepts such as 
data analytics, continuous monitoring and continuous assurance.  As a result, academics 
and auditing standards setters continue to refine and re-define the concept, definition and 
elements of continuous auditing.  For the purposes of this study, the definition of 
continuous auditing is consistent to that of the IIA (2015):  The combination of technology-
enabled ongoing risk and control assessments.  The evolving nature of the continuous 
auditing process and the related topics, data analytics and continuous monitoring is 
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(Sources:  IIA, 2015; KPMG, 2013; IIA, 2011; ISACA, 2011)  
 
Implementing a continuous auditing process is typically preceded by the inclusion of ad 
hoc data analytics during the execution of audit fieldwork (KPMG, 2013).  Although applied 
and managed analytics have a higher degree of automation, these precursors of 
continuous auditing are still classified as traditional auditing (KPMG, 2013).  These have 
the potential to evolve to continuous auditing, by implementing repeatable and managed 
analytical processes (KPMG, 2013).  As the levels of automation and management 
involvement increases, the continuous auditing initiatives may mature to reach the ultimate 
level of maturity, namely continuous assurance (Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015).   
 
The modern definition of continuous auditing consists of four elements, namely continuous 
data auditing, control monitoring, risk monitoring and compliance monitoring 
(Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015).  Transactional data analysis such as isolating outlier 
transactions and measuring changes in internal indicators (e.g. number of high value 
transactions) and external indicators (e.g. macro-economic factors) over time is used to 
provide assurance using continuous data auditing, risk monitoring and compliance 
monitoring (IIA, 2015).  These elements of continuous auditing are excluded from the 
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scope of this study, which focuses on the continuous control monitoring element only.  
The continuous control motoring element provides continuous assurance over the 
adequacy and effectiveness of automated IT controls (IIA, 2015).    
 
Considering that the implementation of continuous auditing techniques and its precursor, 
data analytics, is still immature in practice (Gonzalez et al., 2012), this study will focus on 
practical guidance in order to advance the implementation of continuous auditing 
techniques, as discussed in Chapter 2.  While continuous assurance may be the ultimate 
objective for internal audit practitioners, this level of maturity cannot be achieved if the 
foundational levels are not in place (IIA, 2015).  Therefore, this study focuses on one such 
foundational element, namely continuous controls monitoring of automated IT controls.   
 
When planning for the implementation of continuous auditing procedures, the four 
elements of continuous auditing should be considered.  While implementation guidance 
relating to continuous data, risk and compliance monitoring is generally available, 
limited literature is available relating to the continuous control monitoring element of 
continuous auditing.  As such, an audit planning framework for implementing continuous 
auditing techniques, which focuses on the continuous control monitoring for automated IT 
controls, is discussed in Chapter 4.   
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CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS:  AUDIT PLANNING FRAMEWORK AT A 
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL FOR IMPLEMENTING 
CONTINUOUS AUDITING 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
 
Planning for continuous auditing is not conducted in isolation from planning traditional 
audit procedures, but is rather embedded in the annual audit planning process (IIA, 2015).  
In this chapter, an audit planning framework for implementing continuous auditing is 
developed.  This framework consists of planning at a strategic and operational level, as 
shown in Figure 4.1.   
 
Figure 4.1  Continuous auditing planning levels 
 
 
(Source:  Author’s own construct) 
 
The implementation of continuous auditing is planned firstly at a strategic level when 
developing the overall continuous auditing strategy and the audit plan.  Once the strategy 
is determined, planning is conducted at an operational level for each business process 
identified for continuous auditing.  In Chapter 5, this framework is applied practically by 
developing continuous auditing procedures for database management systems.   
 
 
Strategic audit planning typically commences with developing an audit universe and 
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is recommended that a maturity assessment relating to continuous auditing initiatives is 
performed as part of strategic planning.  Annual planning is followed by a more detailed 
business process risk assessment which would include the development of a continuous 
auditing implementation plan (Level II – refer to paragraph 4.3).   
 
At an operational level, the framework is intended to support the planning of detailed 
procedures for the controls monitoring component of continuous auditing.  In order to 
identify automated IT controls for continuous auditing purposes, the business process risk 
assessment is further broadened by performing an application risk assessment and 
analysing IT access paths (Level III – refer to paragraph 4.4).  Continuous auditing 
procedures are finally developed for each access path component, depending on the 
lifecycle phase of the product’s development (Level IV - refer to paragraph 4.5).   
 
 
4.2 Level I:  Develop the overall audit strategy and plan 
 
The implementation of continuous auditing should commence with developing a strategy 
which considers the current and desired states of maturity for continuous auditing 
initiatives of the particular organisation, as shown in Figure 4.2 (IIA, 2015).  Annual audit 
planning should commence with developing a register of business processes in 
combination with a risk assessment, to identify the potential areas in which to possibly 
perform such procedures (IIA, 2013a).   
 
ISACA and IIA auditing standards require internal audit functions to define an annual 
internal audit plan by following a systematic process, which ensures that all fundamental 
business processes and IT services are included (IIA, 2013a; ISACA, 2014).  This process 
includes liaising with operational management as well as the compliance and risk 
management functions to encourage support of the continuous auditing strategy (IIA, 
2015).  As part of the strategic planning process, the overall audit plan should be adjusted 
to reflect the changes introduced by continuous auditing (IIA, 2015).   
 
However, neither of the IIA (2013a) or the ISACA (2014) auditing standards prescribes a 
specific annual audit planning process to be followed.  Therefore, for the purposes of this 
study, the overall IT audit planning methodology described by the IIA (2008) and the 
continuous audit planning methodology proposed by Corderre (2010) were used in this 
research and are combined below (shown in Figure 4.2).    
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Figure 4.2  Level I:  Develop the overall audit strategy and plan 
 
 
(Sources:  IIA, 2008; Corderre, 2010) 
 
4.2.1 Develop the audit universe 
 
The audit plan should be based on the internal auditor’s understanding of the business, 
including the objectives, strategies and business model that will enable the understanding 
of the organisation’s unique business risks (Corderre, 2010).   
 
Once sufficient knowledge of the business is gathered, the audit universe should be 
documented (IIA, 2008).  The audit universe is a register of audit areas which serves as 
the source from which the annual audit plan is prepared (ISACA, 2016).  The audit 
universe is developed by identifying key business objectives and processes, the software 
applications which support the key processes, the IT infrastructure required by the 
business applications, and the organisation’s IT service support model (IIA, 2008).   
 
The IT audit universe should be embedded in the overall audit universe due to the strong 
interdependencies of IT and the business processes that it supports (IIA, 2013b; Corderre, 
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4.2.2 Perform high-level risk assessment 
 
After the audit universe is documented, a risk assessment should be performed for each 
identified component of the audit universe (IIA, 2008).  This entails determining the impact 
and likelihood of each event which could hinder the organisation from attaining its 
business objectives in an effective, efficient and controlled manner (IIA, 2008).   
 
4.2.3 Develop high-level annual audit plan 
 
The next step is to formulate the audit plan, focusing the auditor’s assurance activities on 
those areas which could provide management with objective information to manage the 
organisation’s business risks (IIA, 2008).  Based on the risk assessment and the level of 
automation of the internal controls, this process will include identifying areas suitable for 
continuous auditing (IIA, 2015).  
 
Planning for continuous auditing activities is not conducted in isolation from the annual 
audit planning process (IIA, 2015).  When developing the audit plan, continuous auditing 
could assist the internal auditor in compiling an audit plan which is responsive to changes 
in business risks (IIA, 2015).  In particular, instead of scheduling audits according to a 
rotational cycle of coverage (e.g. six-monthly, annually, every second year), the frequency 
of audits should rather be determined based on risk, complexity, pervasiveness and 
velocity of change (IIA, 2015).  Continuous data analytics should include leading indicators 
to indicate specific processes or systems for traditional or continuous auditing (IIA, 2015).   
 
The potential areas where continuous auditing is to be implemented are therefore 
identified as part of the overall audit plan development.  However, prior to implementing or 
enhancing continuous auditing, the adopting organisation should perform a maturity 
assessment of the existing data analytics and continuous auditing efforts to assist in 
planning the implementation process (KPMG, 2013).   
 
4.2.4 Perform maturity assessment for continuous auditing activities 
 
The level of maturity of existing data analytics and continuous auditing initiatives should be 
assessed to aid the implementation steps in reaching the desired state of maturity (KPMG, 
2013).  KPMG (2013) recommends that audit functions should use an audit methodology-
based maturity assessment model, as depicted in Table 4.1.   
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The maturity assessment model assesses the capabilities of the data analytics and 
continuous auditing initiatives deployed by the internal audit function (IIA, 2015).  The 
optimisation of such initiatives is measured for five aspects of the audit process, namely 
strategic analysis, enterprise risk management, audit plan development, fieldwork and 
reporting, as well as continuous improvement (KPMG,2013).   
 
It is recommended that the maturity assessment be performed as part of strategic and 
annual audit planning, prior to developing a detailed implementation plan for continuous 
auditing (KPMG, 2013).  Continuous auditing initiatives should also be evaluated 
periodically to refresh the overall strategy and to identify additional controls and 
parameters to be tested (IIA, 2015).   
 
Table 4.1  Level I:  Audit methodology-based maturity assessment model 
 
 
























      
Enterprise risk 
management 
      
Audit plan 
development 
      
Fieldwork and 
reporting 
      
Continuous 
improvement 
      
Type of data 
analytics 
      
  Traditional Auditing Continuous Auditing 
 
 
Data analytics are 
generally not used 
 
Data analytics are partially 
used/sub-optimised 
 
Data analytics are optimised 
(effective and consistent) 
 










(Sources:  IIA, 2015; KPMG, 2013; IIA, 2011; ISACA, 2011)  
 
When conducting the maturity assessment depicted in Table 4.1, the maturity level each of 
the five aspects of the audit process should be assessed, by considering the extent and 
level of integration of analytical capabilities for the specific process (KPMG, 2013).  
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Similarly, data analytics initiatives can be categorised as descriptive, diagnostic, predictive 
or prescriptive (KPMG, 2013).  Analytical capabilities typically progresses from being 
descriptive only, on the least mature end of the scale, to the most mature state that 
includes all four types of analytics (KPMG, 2013).   
 
At the least mature level, data analytics initiatives are mainly descriptive in nature and only 
provide information about the trends, patterns and relationships in existing data (KPMG, 
2013).  As maturity increases, data analytics include diagnostic procedures to understand 
the underlying cause of a particular result (KPMG, 2013).  Analytics may also be predictive 
in nature by using historical data to forecast a predicted outcome for new data sets 
(KPMG, 2013).  At the most mature level, analytics also includes prescriptive procedures 
to articulate the ideal process to follow in response to an event (KPMG, 2013).  
 
For example, audit methodologies which deploy data analytics only during the fieldwork 
and reporting phases of an audit, are classified at the lowest level of maturity, namely ad 
hoc analytics, which is still considered to be traditional auditing (KPMG, 2013).  The data 
analytic capabilities are mainly descriptive in nature at this level (KPMG, 2013).  Only once 
data analytics are optimised across the entire audit process, the continuous assurance 
level have been reached (KPMG, 2013).  At the ultimate level of maturity, analytics are 
descriptive, diagnostic, predictive and prescriptive in nature (KPMG, 2013).  
 
 
4.3 Level II:  Develop a continuous audit implementation plan for selected 
business processes 
 
Based on the overall risk assessment, audit plan and maturity assessment (Level I), the 
internal audit function should develop a road map for continuous auditing which is 
integrated with the annual audit plan (Schultz, 2014).  This commences by conducting a 
risk assessment and identifying key business objectives for each business process.  The 
IIA (2015) suggests that the audit procedures are adapted to specify ongoing risk and 
control indicators.  For the processes where continuous auditing techniques are not 
considered feasible, the traditional audit methodologies will apply (IIA, 2015).   
 
To determine whether continuous auditing methodologies could be implemented, the 
auditor should design specifications for ongoing risk indicators and control measurements 
(IIA, 2015).  The ongoing risk indicators and control measurements should consider the 
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four elements of continuous auditing described in paragraph 3.7, namely continuous data 
auditing, control monitoring, risk monitoring and compliance monitoring (Bumgarner & 
Vasarhelyi, 2015).   
 
Internal auditors and business management should collaborate to determine the leading 
and lagging indicators that measure the risks and controls related to the particular 
business objectives (IIA, 2015).  Schultz (2014) recommends an integrated approach, 
which involves the operational, financial and IT audit teams, as well as management, to 
ensure that all risks and controls are considered.  Continuous data auditing, risk 
monitoring and compliance monitoring are mainly conducted through the implementation 
of transactional data analysis such as isolating outlier transactions and measuring 
changes in key indicators over time (IIA, 2015).  These elements of continuous auditing 
are excluded from the scope of this study, which focuses on the continuous control 
monitoring element only.  Also refer to Figure 4.3.   
 
Figure 4.3  Level II:  Evaluate business processes for continuous auditing  
 
 
                 * not within scope of this study 
(Sources:  IIA, 2015; Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015) 
 
The continuous control monitoring element of continuous auditing provides an independent 
review of the configured application controls and IT general controls by evaluating whether 
controls are adequate and effective, followed by the ongoing identification of changes to 
those controls (IIA, 2015).  To identify the configuration controls relevant to the particular 
business process under review, the IT architecture components underlying that business 
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process should be identified through IT access path analysis to aid the risk assessment 
(Boshoff, 2014).   
 
 
4.4 Level III:  Perform an application risk assessment using access paths 
 
The documentation of an IT audit universe entails, among other things, compiling a 
comprehensive inventory of the organisation’s IT architecture components (IIA, 2008).  
This is done by first identifying those business processes supporting strategic objectives 
and then identifying the underlying technical infrastructure, including the application’s 
program code, database, operating system and network infrastructure (Cascarino, 2012).  
This is referred to as the multi-tier model (Gibbs, Jain, Joshi, Muddamsetti & Singh, 2010), 
as shown in Figure 4.4. 
 




(Sources:  Cascarino, 2012; Davis et al., 2011; Gibbs et al., 2010; IIA, 2008) 
 
Similar to the multi-tier model, the “access path” model was developed by Boshoff (1990).  
This model ensures that all possible access points, relating to each of these IT architecture 
components, are identified.  An access path is the logical route which is activated when an 
end-user accesses computer-controlled resources (Boshoff, 1990).  An end-user may pass 
through one or multiple IT architectural components before obtaining access to the data 
resources (Goosen, 2012).  Access paths typically include the personal computers, 
networking equipment (routers and switches) and application packages, operating systems 
and databases (Boshoff, 2014), as described in Appendix 1.   



















































Identify access path components relevant to the business process 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
36 
Since there may be multiple access paths for the same activity, the auditor should identify 
all possible access paths to the data resources to assess the risks and configurable 
controls associated with each IT component which could be activated during this process 
(Cascarino, 2012).  This includes direct or “backdoor” methods of accessing data by 
operators and programmers (Cascarino, 2012).   
 
A simplified example of an access path schematic is depicted in Figure 4.5 for an end-user 
who processes payroll transactions on an Oracle Human Capital Management (HCM) 
application.   
 
Figure 4.5  Level III:  Simplified example of an IT access path 
 
 
(Source:  Boshoff, 2014) 
 
All the components of an IT access path are essential to enable automated business 
functionality and such components pose risks relating to the availability, integrity and 
confidentiality of data (IIA, 2008).  The degree of risk is influenced by the criticality of the 
business activity supported by the technology, and on the technology’s configuration 
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components, the higher the organisation’s risk profile relating to unauthorised access to 
data (IIA, 2008).   
 
 
4.5 Level IV:  Develop continuous audit procedures for individual access path 
components 
 
Once the IT access path components relevant to the business process under review have 
been identified, detailed audit procedures should be developed, depending on the 
particular lifecycle phase for each access path component.  The product lifecycle consists 
of a series of stages, such as either being build, set-up, configured, maintained or 
operated (Boshoff, 2014).   
 
The lifecycle phase influences the selection of configuration controls (baseline risk and 
control indicators) to test continuously (Boshoff, 2014; Cooke, 2014).  Considering the 
particular access path components and the baseline control standard, the auditor will then 
select the appropriate software tools to be used for continuous auditing purposes (IIA, 
2015), as shown in Figure 4.6.   
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4.5.1 Determine the product’s lifecycle phase 
 
Goosen (2012) developed an integrated IT governance framework which provides 
guidance for implementing configuration controls at an operational level for each access 
path component considering the specific lifecycle phase.  Once all access path 
components for the particular business process have been identified, the identified 
components should be examined by the auditor to ensure that it is correctly built, set up, 
configured, maintained and/or operated through-out the product’s lifecycle in such a 
manner to mitigate the associated risks (Goosen & Rudman, 2014; Boshoff, 2014).  Each 
lifecycle phase is described in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2  Description of product lifecycle phases 
 
Lifecycle Phase Description 
Build 
The build phase is the process of assembling computer hardware components 
to accept an operating system.  Computer software could also be built by 
creating and converting source code files into stand-alone software artefacts, 
which can be executed on a computer.  This includes the conversion of source 
code files to executable code.   
Set-up Set-up refers to the installation of a software program on a computer system.  
Configure 
The initial settings of computer programs are configured according to the 
particular business requirements.  Configurable items include applications, 
server processes and operating system settings.  
Operate 
A computer or system is operated by overseeing the running of the computer.  
Computer operations include the stopping and restarting of selected services 
or the whole computer or system.  
Maintain 
The maintain phase includes software upgrades and computer/hardware 
repairs to ensure the optimum performance and reliability of the device. 
(Source:  Boshoff, 2014).   
 
Boshoff (2014) proposed a framework which links the identified IT access path 
components with the applicable product lifecycle phase, as referred to in Figure 4.7.  The 
auditor firstly determines which lifecycle phase is applicable to the particular access path 
component under review.  Thereafter, audit procedures are developed to address the risks 
particular to that access path component, considering the business risks and lifecycle 
phase.  This framework will be used to develop continuous auditing procedures for 
database management systems, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
Figure 4.7  Level IV:  Identify the lifecycle phase for access path components 
 
  
                                  Determine applicable lifecycle phases 
Access path 
component 
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Server 
 








No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Database 
 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
(Source:  Boshoff, 2014) 
 
4.5.2 Define risk and control indicators (baseline standards) 
 
Continuous audit risk and control indicators should be developed, consistent with the IIA 
standard 2120, to enable ongoing assessments in two dimensions, namely risk and control 
assessments.  This should be done in collaboration with business management and IT 
professionals (IIA, 2015).   
 
The continuous risk assessment dimension should identify increased levels of risk at a 
macro-analytics or strategic level, considering key metrics trends and patterns using 
transactional analysis (KPMG, 2015).  This dimension is excluded from the scope of this 
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The continuous control assessment dimension of continuous auditing entails identifying 
metrics for each business process, considering the underlying IT operations (general 
controls) and configured controls (IIA, 2015).  This is consistent with the continuous control 
monitoring component of continuous auditing (Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015).  For the 
remainder of this study, only this dimension of continuous auditing is discussed.    
 
The IIA (2015) proposes a continuous control monitoring methodology for IT operations 
and applications (systems) that entails continuously assessing configured controls against 
a baseline condition to identify changes to configured controls, as shown in Figure 4.8.  
This concept is similar to the idea of Davis et al. (2011) which entails an initial review of 
the configuration settings of IT systems against the organisation’s development standards.  
Future (i.e. continuous) reviews will entail identifying and reviewing any deviations from the 
baseline standard for such systems (Davis et al., 2011).  An example of a baseline 
standard comparison is depicted in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3  Level IV:  Example of a continuous baseline standard comparison  
 
Configuration Setting/ 








for audit?  
Number of failed login attempts 
permitted 
3 attempts 99 attempts Changed Yes 
Password complexity verification 
is enabled 
Enabled Enabled Unchanged  No 
Default passwords are noted None Yes Failed Yes 
Logging is enabled True True Unchanged No 
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(Sources:  IIA, 2015; Tysiac, 2015; Teeter, 2014; Cooke, 2014)  
 
The control assessment process commences with identifying the control objectives, such 
as validity, confidentially, integrity and availability, which is associated with the process 
and IT system under review (IIA, 2015).  Key configurable controls are then identified 
through scenario analysis and system walk-through descriptions (IIA, 2015; Gibbs et al., 
2010).  Only key controls which address high-risk areas are tested to evaluate whether 
they are adequate in design and operating effectively.  Once evaluated, these controls 
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future (Tysiac, 2015).  If the organisation has documented IT standards, these could also 
be used as the baseline standard (Cooke, 2014).   
 
Once the baseline standard is determined, appropriate analytical procedures should be 
developed to identify any subsequent changes or deviations from the standard (IIA, 2015).  
In particular, the organisation’s data analytics software is configured with this baseline 
standard (Cooke, 2014).  Extracts of system configuration settings are then compared to 
the baseline standard using the data analytics software (Cooke, 2014).  This comparison is 
repeated periodically to highlight changes to the confirmation settings (IIA, 2015).  In this 
manner, non-compliant and changed configuration settings can be identified for review by 
the auditor and possible mitigation by management (IIA, 2015).  Both general analytical 
software and commercial vulnerability assessment tools can be used to achieve this 
objective (Teeter, 2014).   
 
A baseline control standard should be developed for each IT access path component.  
This baseline standard should ideally be determined when the system is implemented (i.e. 
the system is built, set-up and configured), whereafter any subsequent configuration 
changes to such IT components are identified for auditing during the production phase of 
the lifecycle (i.e. when the system is operated and maintained) (IIA, 2015).  The data 
extraction and comparison process should be automated by using inter alia generalised 
audit software (IIA, 2015).   
 
Once the relevant lifecycle phase of the selected access path component and the baseline 
standards for configuration controls have been identified, the auditor can commence with 
selecting the appropriate technology solution to automate the testing of these controls.   
 
4.5.3 Audit software/tool selection 
 
Audit software or tools to be used for specific continuous auditing procedures vary 
depending on the specific access path component under review as well as the particular 
lifecycle phase (IIA, 2011).  Generalised audit software could be used to continuously test 
the configuration controls of the identified access path components at each applicable 
lifecycle phase (Cooke, 2014).  Audit-specific analytical software is flexible and can read 
diverse data types, including mainframe legacy systems, client/server and Internet-
enabled systems, or enterprise resource applications such as SAP and Oracle (IIA, 2015).  
Considering the emphasis on automation and technology in the definition of continuous 
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auditing (refer to paragraph 3.2), the selection of appropriate auditing tools is imperative to 
the continuous auditing methodology (Cangemi, 2015).  Although this research study was 
aimed at developing a generic continuous auditing framework using generalised auditing 
software, four types of software will be discussed, as shown in Figure 4.9.    
 
Figure 4.9  Level IV:  Selecting audit software/tools 
 
 
(Source:  Author’s own construct) 
 
4.5.3.1 Generalised audit software 
 
CAATTs are required to process the large volumes of data of a complex business 
environment (Cascarino, 2012).  Generalised audit software is a sub-set of CAATTs which 
is specifically intended for data retrieval and analysis purposes by auditors (De Kroon & 
Karp, 2013).  The software typically has features to organise, combine, extract, reformat 
and analyse data across multiple data sources and systems (Cascarino, 2012).  It also has 
an audit trail function to log procedures performed by the auditor and has the ability to re-
execute analysis with minor changes (De Kroon & Karp, 2013).   
 
In a survey of data analytics software, the most prevalent generalised audit software used 
by auditors are ACL (Audit Command Language) (39% of respondents) and CaseWare 
Analytics/IDEA (16% of respondents) (AuditNet, 2015).  Other software used by auditors 
are Microsoft Excel (70% of respondents) and Microsoft Access (25% of respondents) 
(AuditNet, 2015).  Conventional programming languages such as SQL may also be an 
option should the auditor have the necessary skills at their disposal (Cascarino, 2012).   
 
Since there are a variety of tools available, the most appropriate technology should be 
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should be done taking into consideration the overall risk assessment, among other things 
(IIA, 2011).   
 
4.5.3.2 Generic vulnerability assessment tools 
 
Vulnerability assessment tools are used by IT management to identify, categorise and 
manage security vulnerabilities such as unsecure system configurations or missing 
security updates of IT architecture components (Rochford & Akshay, 2015).  This type of 
tool typically includes configuration auditing, target profiling, penetration testing and 
detailed vulnerability analysis for widely-used systems (Lindros & Tittel, 2014).  According 
to Rochford and Akshay (2015), these tools typically have the following functionalities:  
 Discover and identify network IT assets;  
 Report the security configuration settings of IT assets and any changes thereto;  
 Establish a baseline of vulnerability conditions for devices, applications and 
databases;  
 Produce customised reports for specific compliance regimes, control frameworks and 
audiences. 
 
This market is dominated by five vendors namely BeyondTrust, Rapid7, Tenable Network 
Security (Nessus), Tripwire and Qualys (Rochford & Akshay, 2015).  Negligible differences 
have been noted between solutions, while purchase decisions are mostly based on cost 
(Rochford & Akshay, 2015).  
 
Although there are a number of generic vulnerability assessment tools available, it is not 
always feasible to implement these tools.  In particular, Cooke (2014) and Teeter (2014) 
point out the following:  
 Commercial tools may be too costly for smaller organisations;  
 Geographically dispersed organisations may not have full network connectivity 
between all locations, which increases the implementation cost of such tools;  
 Auditors may not have permission to install tools which require full system 
administrator privileges; 
 The organisation may not authorise the implementation of such tools, considering the 
organisation’s limited insight into the potential impact of such tools;     
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 Commercial solutions do not cater for all the risks and controls in the client’s 
environment, resulting in inadequate functionality.  
 
4.5.3.3 Specific vulnerability assessment tools 
 
There are several security assessment tools that are used by the system, security 
administrators and auditors to assess the security of IT architecture components.  These 
tools typically have two modes of operation, namely a non-intrusive scan mode and an 
attack mode, which may disrupt the operation of the system (Finnigan, 2016).  These tools 
may be product- or component-specific.  Examples of database-specific vulnerability 
assessment tools are AppDetectivePro, Scuba (Imperva), NGSSQuirreL for Oracle and 
AppSentry (Finnigan, 2016).   
 
4.5.3.4 Password strength and hacking tools 
 
Password strength tests can be executed to determine whether any password associated 
with an access path component is easy to guess (Davis et al., 2011).  Free-of-charge and 
commercial password strength or hacking tools are easily available.  Examples of such 
tools include AppSentry and NGSSQuirreL (ISACA, 2009).  Without configured password 
controls, these tools can recover 90% of passwords in ±30 seconds (ISACA, 2009).  This 
type of tool is however limited to password strength tests and serves a limited purpose in 
continuous auditing (ISACA, 2009).   
 
4.5.4 Report and manage results 
 
Similar to audit tool selection, planning for continuous auditing should include selecting 
reporting mechanisms (IIA, 2015).  Successful continuous auditing programs support 
decision making and the remediation of any control deviations (IIA, 2015).  A variety of 
reporting solutions may be implemented to meet the needs of management, the risk and 
compliance functions and the board of directors.  This may include publishing electronic 
reports, as well as using traditional reporting formats, which include root-cause analysis 
and management’s action plans (IIA, 2015).   
 
The IIA (2015) recommends that reporting strategies are adapted to include sharing 
exceptions with management via electronic mechanisms in the following ways:   
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 Exceptions could be exported to a shared network folder or secure database for 
management review. 
 E-mail notifications and workflow remediation tracking tools could be deployed to 
notify management in real-time of any exceptions. 
 Trending information can be presented using web-based dash boards and data 
visualisation tools. 
 
Deloitte (2016) recommends that interactive electronic reporting mechanisms are deployed 






The implementation of continuous auditing procedures should follow a structured 
framework that includes planning at both strategic and operational levels, as shown in 
Figure 4.10.   
 
Planning for continuous auditing commences at a strategic level when developing the audit 
universe and resulting annual audit plan.  At this stage, a maturity assessment is 
conducted of existing continuous auditing initiatives to identify the business processes 
where the continuous auditing methodology could be implemented or improved (IIA, 2015).  
An overall implementation strategy is required to ensure support from management as well 
as the risk and compliance functions (IIA, 2015).   
 
Each business process is then further analysed by means of a risk assessment to identify 
risk and control indicators, which is evaluated to determine whether it is suited to 
continuous auditing (IIA, 2015).  Any (or all) of the four elements of continuous auditing 
(namely continuous data auditing, control monitoring, risk monitoring and compliance 
monitoring) could be relevant to the business process under review, depending on the risk 
assessment (Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015).   
 
In this study, only one element of continuous auditing, namely continuous control 
monitoring, is examined at an operational level.  Continuous control monitoring is the 
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ongoing assessment of configured (automated) controls (Bumgarner & Vasarhelyi, 2015).  
The IT access path model developed by Boshoff (1990) could be used to identify the 
relevant IT architecture components which could be audited using continuous audit 
techniques.  In this manner, all possible access points, which are activated when an end-
user accesses a computer-controlled resource, are identified (Goosen, 2012).   
 
A detailed risk assessment is conducted for each access path component, considering the 
lifecycle phase of the particular component.  Thereafter, a baseline standard is developed 
for the identified configuration controls for that particular access path component (IIA, 
2015).  Generalised audit software can be used to continuously compare the baseline 
standard with the configuration settings extracted directly from the system under review 
(Cooke, 2014).  Any changes in these settings could be an early-warning indicator of a 
potential control violation or deficiency (IIA, 2015). 
 
Using the audit planning framework developed in this study (refer to Figure 4.10), 
continuous auditing procedures (i.e. continuous controls monitoring) were subsequently 
developed for a widely-used database management system, namely Oracle Database, in 
Chapter 5. 
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Figure 4.10 Planning framework for developing continuous auditing procedures 
 


























































































































































Not within scope of this study 
Detailed continuous auditing procedures for a specific access path component,  
e.g. database management system (Chapter 5) 
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CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS:  DEVELOPING CONTINUOUS AUDITING 





Continuous audit procedures relating to configuration controls entail the ongoing 
evaluation of automated controls against a baseline standard to identify configuration 
changes and risk indicators, as discussed in Chapter 4.  The generic audit planning 
framework developed in Chapter 4 could be applied to develop continuous auditing 
procedures for any IT architecture component such as database management systems.  In 
this chapter, the generic framework is applied to describe the continuous auditing 
procedures, specifically focusing on database management systems in each relevant 
phase of the product’s lifecycle.  The examples are limited to Oracle Database only.   
 
Sensitive and valuable organisational data (such as personal information, intellectual 
property and financial data) is typically stored in databases.  Database management 
systems are therefore often the target of security breaches.  McAfee (2015) noted that 
68% of data breaches were of such significance that it required public disclosure or had a 
negative financial impact.  Internal perpetrators (i.e. employees, contractors and suppliers) 
were responsible for 43% of the breaches, while external perpetrators were responsible for 
57% of breaches (McAfee, 2015).  Customer and employee information, including 
personally identifiable information, were in the top two content categories, followed by 
intellectual property and payment card information (McAfee, 2015).  Therefore, internal 
controls should ensure that databases, which contain valuable organisational data, are 
protected against internal and external breaches.  As such, the risks related to the validity, 
integrity and confidentiality of data is of a primary concern to the auditor (Davis et al., 
2011).   
 
The continuous auditing procedures described in this chapter are therefore limited to only 
those controls that ensure the validity, integrity and confidentiality of data, while the 
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5.2 Configurable controls for database management systems 
 
Configuration controls for database management systems addressing the validity, integrity 
and confidentiality of data can typically be grouped into six control categories, as shown in 
Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1  Control categories for database management systems 
 
(Sources:  Rahman, 2014; Cooke, 2014; Davis et al., 2011; ISACA, 2009) 
 
 Database vulnerabilities could be exploited by unauthorised parties to gain access 
to sensitive data within the database.  Therefore, database management systems 
should be operated using supported versions of the software (Rahman, 2014).  Patch 
updates, i.e. repairs to software programming errors and vulnerabilities (ISACA, 
2016), should also be current (Rahman, 2014).  Refer to paragraph 5.3. 
 
 Account and password management includes the management of user accounts, 
account creation and termination, naming conventions and password management 
capabilities.  Refer to paragraph 5.4.  
 
 Permissions management entails assigning database privileges to users on a least-
privilege principle (Rahman, 2014).  In particular, administrators and end-users 
should only have access to the minimum roles and privileges which are required to 














































* Not within scope of this study 
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 Database auditing and monitoring are implemented to create an audit trail of 
selected high-risk activities on the database, by both database and non-database 
users (Miller & Kost, 2016).  This audit trail is not only required in regulated 
industries, but may help to ensure accountability of users by tracking their actions 
(Huey, 2016).  Refer to paragraph 5.6. 
 
 Advance database security measures such as data encryption, data masking 
(changed or substituted data) and data redaction (scrubbed or hidden data) could be 
introduced in environments that require additional controls for high-risk data elements 
(Huey, 2014).  Advanced security measures are excluded from the scope of this 
research as these measures are typically only implemented in highly controlled 
environments and are often implemented using proprietary software in addition to the 
database management system software.   
 
 Operating system security – Insufficient security of the operating system layer of 
the access path may expose the database management system environment to 
security risks (Davis et al., 2011).  The operating system is a separate access path 
component and is excluded from the scope of this research which focuses on 
database management systems only.   
 
Cooke (2014) proposes an audit approach to extract and review the above control 
categories using generalised audit software in conjunction with information taken directly 
from the particular database management system under review, such as the data 
dictionary and certain initialisation parameters.   
 
The data dictionary contains information about every object in the database, including 
users, privileges, roles and auditing information.  The contents of the data dictionary can 
be queried using the Oracle Database data dictionary views and initialisation parameters 
which can be retrieved from the V$PARAMETER view (Cooke, 2014).  There are 
approximately 260 Oracle Database initialisation parameters (Cooke, 2014).  Examples of 
parameters include those for enabling the auditing of the activities of privileged users and 
security settings such as password parameters (Cooke, 2014).  Not all the parameters of 
interest need to be reviewed for all databases.  The master profile should only include 
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those parameters mitigating the risks relevant to the particular database, i.e. the 
configuration control categories listed in Figure 5.1 (Cooke, 2014). 
 
Data dictionary views are static and are prefixed with ‘DBA_’.  Similarly, Oracle Database 
maintains dynamic performance views that are continuously updated.  These dynamic 
views are prefixed with ‘V$’ (Cooke, 2014).  All static data dictionary (DBA_) and dynamic 
(V$) views, together with detailed explanations, can be found in the Oracle Database 
Reference which is published on the Oracle website (Rich, 2016).   
 
Cooke (2014) suggests that the static dictionary (DBA_) and dynamic (V$) views are 
extracted for auditing using the SQL*Plus query tool.  SQL*Plus is included in every Oracle 
database installation and enables querying the database using Structured Query 
Language (SQL) (Cooke, 2014).  The output can be formatted as required to be directed to 
a file (e.g. comma-separated value (CSV) text file) for further analysis using generalised 
audit software (Cooke, 2014).   
 
Using generalised audit software, the extracts are compared to baseline standards in the 
configuration phase of the product’s lifecycle (IIA, 2015).  Thereafter, the extracts are 
analysed for any changes since the previous extract, as described in paragraph 4.5.2.   
 
The continuous audit procedures listed in this chapter are addressed for the four control 
categories within the scope of this research, as depicted in Figure 5.1.  For each control 
category, the risks, controls and audit procedures are discussed briefly.  Both traditional 
and continuous auditing procedures are described using Oracle Database as example.  
The continuous auditing procedures are subsequently tabled for each component, 
including the SQL query to extract the relevant audit data.  The tables also indicate the 
phases of the product lifecycle which are relevant for each procedure.  Only the configure, 
operate and maintain phases are included in the tables, since the build phase is not 
relevant for database management systems, as this phase pertains mostly to hardware 
components.  In addition, the set-up phase is excluded, as the risks and controls are 
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5.3 Database vulnerabilities:  Product version and patch management 
 
Database vulnerabilities may be exploited by internal and external perpetrators to gain 
unauthorised access to the database (McAfee, 2015).  This risk is mitigated by ensuring 
the database management system’s product version remains supported by the product 
vendor and that security patches are up-to-date (Cooke, 2014).   
 
5.3.1 Product version 
 
The product version of legacy databases may no longer be supported by the database 
vendor (Davis et al., 2011).  For example, support for Oracle Database 11g Release 2 was 
suspended in January 2015 and extended support will end in December 2020 (Oracle, 
2016).   
 
Risks   
The increasing risk of unsupported software could result in software no longer receiving 
security updates, software (program) code updates or online technical content updates 
(Davis et al., 2011).  Compared to legacy systems, modern systems are protected by 
advanced security technologies which are specifically designed to increase the complexity 
of the attack to be carried out by cyber criminals in order to exploit any particular 
vulnerability (Microsoft, 2013).  The appeal for cyber criminals to exploit vulnerabilities is 
therefore reduced for modern product versions (Microsoft, 2013).   
 
Controls   
An organisation’s IT standards and policies should define the requirements and processes 
to ensure that all implemented database product versions are supported by the particular 
software vendor (Davis et al., 2011).   
 
Procedures   
Traditional audit procedures entail determining which product versions are 
recommended and implemented by the organisation.  Thereafter, a register of the relevant 
databases and the respective versions should be obtained or compiled by the auditor 
(Davis et al., 2011).  The final step is to verify whether the product versions in use by the 
organisation are still supported by the software vendor (Davis et al., 2011).  The auditor 
can determine the product version by browsing system management modules or the data 
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dictionary (Microsoft, 2016), while software vendors publish details of supported product 
versions on the internet (Davis et al., 2011).   
 
Continuous audit procedures entail an initial policy review, similar to the traditional audit 
procedures.  However, procedures to determine the product version are automated using 
scripts.  Audit procedures to test the version include the following:   
 Although it is not expected that unsupported product versions will be installed in the 
configuration phase, testing may be conducted to determine the version, in order to 
aid the risk assessment and the development of other procedures (refer to Table 5.1 
item 1).   
 The product version extracted using the query statement can be compared to 
supported versions as published by the software vendor using analytical software 
(refer to Table 5.1 item 1).  
 
5.3.2 Patch management 
 
Software vendors publish regular scheduled software updates, known as patch releases, 
to maintain up-to-date software, repair software programming defects and address security 
vulnerabilities (Hoehl, 2013).  Patch management is an area of systems management that 
involves acquiring, testing and installing multiple patches (code changes) to computer 
systems (ISACA, 2016).   
 
Risks   
With the proliferation of malware and network intrusions, it has become more critical to 
implement patch updates in a timely manner in order to protect information systems 
(Hoehl, 2013).  Not only may unpatched systems render systems vulnerable to malicious 
attacks (causing system downtime and unauthorised disclosure of confidential data, for 
example), but it may also impair the organisation’s ability to conduct business (Hoehl, 
2013).  For example, credit card associations such as American Express may impose non-
validation fees on merchants and may terminate the agreement if merchants do not fulfil 
contractual requirements regarding patch updates; that is, merchants may not continue to 
accept credit cards if patch updates are not implemented timeously (Hoehl, 2013).  In 
addition, customers may rather prefer to do business with organisations that do comply 
with security best practices (Hoehl, 2013).   
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Although the application of patch updates is intended to mitigate risk, this process is 
potentially disruptive and may introduce significant risks if it is not managed appropriately 
(IIA, 2012).  Patch updates typically affect critical system libraries and other software used 
by database management systems.  Although patch updates tend to entail significant 
changes, there is often limited documentation available that describes the underlying 
changes (IIA, 2012).  As a result, small configuration variances may have unexpected and 
disruptive results; for instance critical systems, including databases, may be unavailable 
for a prolonged period (IIA, 2012).  
 
Controls   
Organisations should have policies and procedures to identify and timeously apply any 
new patch updates.  Rahman (2014) recommends that database administrators subscribe 
to the particular software vendor’s notification service to be alerted of scheduled and 
unscheduled patch updates.  For example, Oracle patches and security alerts are 
published via the Oracle e-mail security alert advisory service (Rahman, 2014).   
 
Patch management should be considered as a subset of change management, and 
implementing patch updates should follow the same process as for any other change 
implemented in the IT environment (ISACA, 2016; IIA, 2012).  Critical patch updates can 
have a significant impact on the database, depending on the database schema.  
Therefore, extensive regression testing may be required to ensure that applying the latest 
patch update has no impact on the database functionality (Rahman, 2014).      
 
Procedures   
Davis et al. (2011) propose a traditional audit methodology that entails interviewing the 
database administrator and reviewing the policies and procedures which ensure that patch 
updates are identified, tested and applied systematically and timeously.  The auditor 
should also determine how the risk related to each patch is assessed and whether 
alternative mitigating controls are considered instead of installing the patch update, such 
as removing the system components that introduce the particular vulnerability or blocking 
the vulnerability with a firewall (IIA, 2012).   
 
Following the policy review, a register of the databases together with its patch should be 
obtained from the database administrator or compiled by the auditor (Davis et al., 2011).  
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The final step is to determine the latest patch update details published by the software 
vendor (Davis et al., 2011).   
 
Continuous audit procedures for patch management entail an initial policy and process 
review, similar to the traditional audit procedures.  The same queries as for the product 
version can be utilised to determine the patch status of a database (refer to paragraph 
5.3.1).   
 
Audit procedures to test the patch status of the database include the following:  
 Although is not expected that unpatched software will be installed in the configuration 
phase, testing may be conducted to determine the patch levels (refer to Table 5.1 
item 2).   
 The patch level extracted using the query statement can be compared to the latest 
patch levels published by the software vendor using analytical software (refer to 
Table 5.1 item 2). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
57 
Table 5.1  Continuous audit procedures: Database vulnerabilities 
 
Risk/Control Area 
SQL*Plus query statement or DBA view 
extracted to obtain Oracle configuration 
Procedure relevant to particular product lifecycle phase? 
Configure Operate Maintain 
1. Product version Query statement to extract product version: 
 
SELECT* FROM V$VERSION 
 
Compare to product version information 
published online (typically available in table 








2. Patch management Query statement to extract patch level:  
 
SELECT* FROM V$VERSION 
 
Compare to patch information published 







   ** Procedure may not necessarily be relevant, as it is not expected 
that unsupported or unpatched software will be installed in the 
configuration phase. 
 
(Sources:  Cooke, 2014; Rahman, 2014; ISACA, 2009) 
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5.4 Account and password management 
 
User account and password management are the primary controls to restrict access to the 
database (Davis et al., 2011).  User account management, username and password 
conventions as well as password parameters are the control areas that are relevant to 
ensure access is restricted to authorised users only (Rahman, 2014).  
 
5.4.1 User account management 
 
Risks 
In the absence of appropriate user account management procedures, users may obtain 
inappropriate or unauthorised access to the database (ISACA, 2009).  Risks include 
unauthorised changes to data and the exposure of confidential, sensitive or regulated 
information (Gibbs et al., 2010).  In addition, if generic (shared) user accounts are used, 
individual users cannot be associated with specific actions performed on the database and 
can therefore not be held accountable for those actions (ISACA, 2009).   
 
Controls 
Application end-users should typically not have direct access to a database, but should 
rather gain access to the database through the application front-end (Davis et al., 2011).  
Therefore, to limit unnecessary access, organisations should also implement effective 
controls for the provisioning and revocation of access to databases.  This includes the 
procedures for creating user accounts and ensuring that accounts are created only for 
legitimate business requirements, particularly when privileged access is to be granted 
(Davis et al., 2011).  Also, the organisation should implement processes to identify and 
revoke user accounts timeously following the termination of employment or a change in 
the job requirements of the particular use.  This may include a periodic access review by 
the database administrator (Davis et al., 2011).   
 
Procedures 
Traditional audit procedures include reviewing the user list for application end-users with 
database access for any instances of inappropriate access.  As direct database access is 
not desirable, the auditor should review the need for any users to have such access.  In 
addition, no guest or generic (shared) accounts should exist (Davis et al., 2011).  A sample 
of new users could be reviewed to establish whether the standard authorisation process 
was followed (Davis et al., 2011).  The access granted can also be reviewed in relation to 
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the particular user’s job function.  The account termination process could be confirmed by 
reviewing a sample of users to identify terminated users and those users whose job 
functions have changed (Davis et al., 2011).   
 
The continuous audit process will commence in the configuration phase with extracting 
the database users, together with their roles and privileges, using database queries and 
analytical software (Cooke, 2014).  A user list containing the user names, account status, 
last login dates, roles and privileges is not readily available, but can be constructed using 
analytical software by joining the various tables listed in Table 5.2 (ISACA, 2009). 
 
Table 5.2  Oracle DBA tables for user access review 
 
DBA view Description 
DBA_USERS User accounts with status (open, locked, expired) and last login date   
DBA_ROLES Defined roles and authentication type (i.e. password protected)  
DBA_ROLE_PRIVS Mapping of users to assigned roles 
DBA_SYS_PRIVS System privileges granted to users and roles 
DBA_TAB_PRIVS Object privileges granted to users and roles 
ROLE_ROLE_PRIVS Roles granted to other roles 
ROLE_SYS_PRIVS System privileges granted to each role 
ROLE_TAB_PRIVS Table privileges granted to each role 
 
(Sources:  Cooke, 2014; ISACA,.2009) 
 
 The initial user list is reviewed for appropriate access, similar to the traditional review.  
Using generalised audit software, this user list is then compared to an extract of 
current employees and their job descriptions as per the human resources system 
(Cooke, 2014).  This comparison should also highlight potential generic accounts 
(Davis et al., 2011).  Once validated in the configuration phase, the initial user list is 
used as baseline to identify any new users added since the last review or any users 
with changed job descriptions (Cooke, 2014).  This is repeated periodically during the 
maintain phase of the product’s lifecycle.  Refer to Table 5.5 item 1. 
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 Dormant accounts can also be identified by reviewing the last date that the particular 
user logged onto the database, using the same extracts as above (Miller & Kost, 
2016).  Refer to Table 5.5 item 2. 
 
5.4.2 Default accounts and passwords 
 
Risks  
Default database accounts with default usernames and passwords are created when the 
database is implemented, or later during the operation of the database, for example when 
performing upgrades (Finnigan, 2016).  As default accounts and password are well-known 
and widely published, an attacker (e.g. an external hacker, internal employee or malware) 
can exploit a default account to gain unauthorised access to the database (Finnigan, 
2016).  As default accounts typically have critical system privileges, unauthorised parties 
could gain access to both view and change sensitive data (Finnigan, 2016).  Widely 
available hacking tools such as Metaspoilt and Backtrack have a high success rate when 
attempting to compromise default accounts with default passwords (ISACA, 2009).   
 
Details of default database accounts of widely used systems are listed on various security 
websites (Rahman, 2014).  For example, ±600 default Oracle accounts and passwords 
(refer to Table 5.3) are published online (Finnigan, 2016).   
 








Database management account with privileges to read, change and 




The most powerful database management account with privileges to 
read, change and delete data   
DBSNMP DBSNMP 
Under certain circumstances, DBSNMP allows to read passwords from 
memory 
SYSMAN SYSMAN 
The management account for Oracle Enterprise Manager which is 
used to access all databases that are managed by it, and may access 
all data in these databases 
 
(Sources:  Finnigan, 2016; Rahman, 2014) 
 
The risk is reduced for new installations of later versions of Oracle Database (i.e. 11g and 
12c) for which the default accounts are either locked or require a new password during the 
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database installation (Finnigan, 2016).  This does however not address the risk for Oracle 
installations which were upgraded from previous versions (Finnigan, 2016).   
 
Controls  
Database administrators should ensure that all default accounts are configured with a 
strong password.  If a particular account is not required, the account should be locked and 
expired (Rahman, 2014).  For later versions of Oracle Database (i.e. 11g and later), the 
Oracle database configuration assistant (DBCA) automatically locks and expires the 
majority of the default database user accounts, unless the database is installed manually 
(Rahman, 2014).  The DBCA also changes the password of the SYSTEM account to the 
value specified during the installation routine (Rahman, 2014).   
 
Procedures   
Traditional audit procedures entail reviewing the user list for default accounts and then 
attempting to log onto the database using the default passwords (ISACA, 2009).   
 
Continuous auditing procedures involve the automation of the above-mentioned 
traditional audit procedure to identify all default accounts and passwords, by extracting the 
user tables and comparing the password hashes with pre-computed password hashes 
published on the Internet (Finnigan, 2016).  Refer to Table 5.5 item 3.   
Audit procedures to identify default accounts and passwords include the following:   
 In the configuration phase, default accounts are created when the database is 
installed.  For example, the SYS and SYSTEM accounts are created by default when 
the database is installed by using a wizard (Finnigan, 2016).  Continuous auditing 
procedures should be developed to identify any such default accounts for 
remediation by management.  No such accounts should have default passwords, 
even though the system is still in the configuration phase (Cooke, 2014). 
 The process is repeated during the operate and maintain phases to identify any 
default accounts which were installed or unlocked subsequent to the initial 
configuration.  Further default accounts can be created after the initial database 
installation when executing default scripts, located in the $ORACLE_HOME/ 
rdbms/admin directory, to add an additional feature to the database (Finnigan, 2016).  
In addition, default database users are also created when third party software (e.g. 
SAP) is installed (Finnigan, 2016).  
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If default accounts and passwords are limited as per the best practice guidelines, the 
continuous auditing procedures should deliver very little exceptions (Cooke, 2014).   
 
5.4.3 Password management capabilities  
 
Risks 
Users often choose passwords that can be guessed easily by automated programs (Davis 
et al., 2011).  Unless password management capabilities are enabled, weak passwords 
could be exploited to gain unauthorised access to the database (Davis et al., 2011).  In the 
absence of password management features, these tools can recover 90% of passwords in 
less than 30 seconds (ISACA, 2009).   
 
Although modern database management systems may have robust password 
management capabilities, the features are not necessarily enabled (Rahman, 2014).  For 
example, Oracle password parameters are assigned to profiles which, in turn, are 
assigned to users (Rahman, 2014).  The default Oracle profile (with unlimited parameters) 
is assigned to all users where no alternative profile is specified when the user is created 
(Rahman, 2014).   
 
Earlier versions of Oracle Database (i.e. version 8 and earlier) do not have any password 
management capabilities (ISACA, 2009).  From Oracle Database 11g onwards, enhanced 
password controls such as password strength validation and case-sensitive passwords are 
available, but may still be disabled (ISACA, 2009). 
 
Controls 
Database management systems typically include rich password management features.  
Oracle includes features for password expiry, re-use limits, lockout and lockout reset 
(Rahman, 2014).  Refer to Table 5.4 for a summary of Oracle Database password 
parameters and the recommended benchmark setting for Oracle 12c.  
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Table 5.4  Description of recommended Oracle 12c password parameters  
 
Password Parameter Description Benchmark 
FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS 
The maximum number of failed login attempts 
before an account is locked 
5 attempts 
PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME 
The number of days that an account will be 
locked if the maximum number of failed login 
attempts is exceeded 
1 day 
PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME 
Password expiration, i.e. the number of days 
before a particular password expires 
90 days 
PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME 
The grace period before a password expires, 
i.e. following a warning message 
5 days 
PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME * 
Password history, i.e. the number of days 
before a previously used password can be 
reused   
90 days 
PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX * 
Password history, i.e. the number of times 
that a password must be changed before a 
previously used password can be reused   
10 times 
PASSWORD_VERIFY_FUNCTION 
Evaluates the complexity of a password, e.g. 
test for password length, special characters, 
dictionary words, username, etc. 
Enabled 
SEC_MAX_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS 
Restricts the number of failed authentication 
attempts from a particular connection to slow 
down brute force (hacking) attacks   
10 times 
SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON 
Passwords are case sensitive by default only 
for Oracle 11g and later   
Enabled  
*  Password reuse_time and reuse_max are mutually exclusive.  
(Sources:  CIS, 2015; Rahman, 2014)  
 
Procedures  
Traditional audit procedures for password management commence with an interview 
with the database administrator to ascertain whether the password parameters available 
for the database system have been enabled (Davis et al., 2011).  Once the configuration 
values for password management have been obtained, the auditor should ensure that 
each feature is enabled according to the organisation’s information security policies (Davis 
et al., 2011).  The auditor should also evaluate whether a particular setting is appropriate, 
considering the particular risk assessment for that organisation and system (Davis et al., 
2011).   
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Continuous audit procedures for password management entail the automation of the 
traditional audit procedures, by reviewing the password configuration settings and testing 
for default profiles (Rahman, 2014).    
Audit procedures relating to password management capabilities include the following:   
 The password management parameters are extracted from the applicable Oracle 
table for comparison to best practice or organisational security standards during the 
configuration phase (ISACA, 2009).  This test is repeated periodically in the maintain 
phase to detect any changes to the standard password parameters.  Refer to Table 
5.5 item 4.   
 Procedures should be included in the configure and maintain phases to identify any 
user accounts that have been assigned the default password profile (i.e. with 
unlimited password parameters) (ISACA, 2009).  No user should have this profile 
(ISACA, 2009).  Refer to Table 5.5 item 5.   
 In addition to the continuous configuration procedures, password strength tests can 
be executed on password hashes to determine whether any passwords are easy to 
guess (Davis et al., 2011).  Password strength tools are widely available, both free 
and commercially, as discussed in paragraph 4.5.3.4.  Refer to Table 5.5 item 6. 
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Table 5.5  Continuous audit procedures:  User account and password management 
 
Risk/Control Area 
SQL*Plus query statement or DBA view extracted to 
obtain Oracle configuration 
Procedure relevant to particular product lifecycle phase? 
Configure Operate Maintain 
1. Direct end-user 
access 
Direct database users can be identified by querying the 
SYS.DBA_USERS table: 
 
SELECT USERNAME, ACCOUNT_STATUS  
 
 
YES NO YES 
2. Dormant users Dormant users can be identified by the following query 
of the SYS.DBA_USERS table: 
 
SELECT USERNAME, ACCOUNT_ STATUS, COMMON, 
LAST_LOGIN FROM SYS.DBA_USERS   
 
Dormant users can be identified by interrogating the 
date information in the LAST_LOGIN column of the table. 
 
 
NO NO YES 
 
3. Default usernames 
and passwords 
Default user names and passwords are identified by 
extracting DBA_USERS and matching the password 
hashes to pre-computed password hashes published on 
the internet: 
 
The database view DBA_USERS_WITH_ 
DEFPWD (11g and later) lists all default accounts with 
default passwords. 
 
YES YES YES 
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Risk/Control Area 
SQL*Plus query statement or DBA view extracted to 
obtain Oracle configuration 
Procedure relevant to particular product lifecycle phase? 






Password parameters are extracted from DBA_PROFILES 
and compared to standards as per Table 5.4.   
 
SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT FROM 
DBA_PROFILES WHERE RESOURCE_NAME=”X”  
 









User accounts with default profiles can be extracted 
from the DBA_USERS view using the following script: 
 
SELECT USERNAME FROM DBA_USERS WHERE PROFILE = 
‘DEFAULT’’ 
 
No user should have this profile.   
 




Extract DBA_USERS for further analysis using password 
strength test tools such as John the Ripper, Oracle 










(Sources:  Miller & Kost, 2016; Cooke, 2014; ISACA, 2009)  
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5.5 Database permissions management 
 
5.5.1 Database permissions – background 
 
Permissions management entails assigning database privileges to users on a least-
privilege principle; that is, administrators and end-users should only have access to the 
minimum roles and privileges that are required to perform their job function (Rahman, 
2014).  Continuous audit procedures could be utilised to identify any administrators and 
users with either excessive or unauthorised access (CIS, 2015).   
 
Database privileges are managed in two categories, namely system privileges and object 
privileges ISACA, 2009).  System privileges allow the user to create or manipulate objects 
such as tables or triggers, e.g. CREATE TABLE, CREATE ANY TRIGGER, DROP ANY 
PROCEDURE (ISACA, 2009).  A database object is anything that exists in a database and 
on which operations can be performed (e.g. program files, triggers, libraries, tables, views 
and folders) (ISACA, 2009).  Object privileges (SELECT, INSERT, DELETE, etc.) enable 
the user to access data with an object.  For example, any user with DELETE access to the 
ORDERS table will be able to delete a row from the table containing order information 
(ISACA, 2009).   
 
Both object and system privileges introduce the risk of unauthorised access or changes to 
data; therefore, this type of access should preferably be restricted to database 
administrators (ISACA, 2009).  Audit procedures during both the configure and maintain 
phases of the product’s lifecycle should identify any object and system privileges assigned 
to user accounts which do not have a database administrator role (Rahman, 2014) 
 
Although privileges could be assigned directly to users, these privileges should preferably 
be assigned to roles (groups) which should then in turn be assigned to users (Larner, 
2014).  This allows for easier maintenance of security controls and reduces the risk of 
administrative mistakes when assigning roles (ISACA, 2009).  The correct manner to 
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(Source:  Author’s own construct) 
 
5.5.2 Review database privileges granted to end-users 
 
Risks   
Application end-users should typically not have direct access to a database, but should 
rather gain access to the database through the application.  Should direct access be 
granted to database users, there is an increased risk of inappropriate access to change or 
view critical data (Rahman, 2014).   
 
In addition, database users may be assigned access to data and privileges which are not 
required in terms of their job function (Davis et al., 2011).  The risk of excessive privileges 
increases when privileges are assigned directly to users, instead of indirectly through the 
use of roles (also referred to as user group membership) (ISACA, 2009).   
 
Controls 
Should direct access be necessary, Rahman (2014) recommends that organisations 
practise the principle of least privilege; that is, database users (or roles) should not be 
granted more privileges than necessary in order to perform their job function.  Database 
security standards should specify those systems and object privileges that should not be 









Privilege 1 Privilege 2 Privilege 3 
Correct:  Privileges are assigned to roles.  
Roles are assigned to users. 
Incorrect:  Privileges are assigned directly to users. 
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Database best practice recommends that permissions are granted to roles (user groups) 
instead of individuals (Davis et al., 2011).  Roles or group membership is then assigned to 
the individuals.  This principle should be included in the documented database standards 
(ISACA, 2009).   
 
To implement the principle of least privilege, Rahman (2014) recommends that high-risk 
permissions should either not be assigned to end-users, but rather to privileged users only.  
In particular:  
 End-users should not have the ability to create, modify or delete database objects via 
permissions such as TRUNCATE TABLE, DELETE TABLE, DROP TABLE.   
 The role required to export the full database (EXP_FULL_ DATABASE) could enable 
the extraction of data for unauthorised distribution. 
 Library-related privileges (CREATE LIBRARY and CREATE ANY LIBRARY) enable 
the creation of library objects and could corrupt the library’s integrity.   
 
Procedures   
Audit procedures should be developed to ensure that database access is limited to users 
with legitimate reasons for direct database access.  Traditional audit procedures entail a 
discussion with the database administrator to determine which end-user accounts are 
required to have direct access to the database, and to what data (Davis et al., 2011).  End-
users should be distinguished from administrator accounts and system accounts (e.g. web 
application accounts) and accounts used to process batch jobs (Davis et al., 2011).   
 
The traditional audit also includes a manual review of the database dictionary for 
permissions that were granted to an account or user, instead of using roles or groups.  
This is done with the assistance of the database administrator (ISACA, 2009).   
 
For continuous auditing purposes, the traditional audit procedures are automated, 
instead of relying on the database administrator for this information.  Audit procedures to 
test the database privileges granted to end-users include the following: 
 The auditor compiles a user list with role and privilege details by joining the tables 
containing usernames, roles and privileges (ISACA, 2009).  During the configuration 
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phase, the audit objective is to determine whether the access associated with each 
user is appropriate considering their job function (Rahman, 2014).  The procedure is 
then repeated continuously during the maintain phase to identify any new users with 
excessive database privileges.  Refer to Table 5.6 item 1.  
 During both the configure and maintain phases, any end-users with privileged roles, 
such as database administrator, should be identified (Huey, 2016).  Typically, no 
end-user should have this role (Huey, 2016).  Refer to Table 5.6 item 2. 
 No user should have any permissions which were granted directly to the user 
account instead of indirectly via a role, as demonstrated in Figure 5.2 (ISACA, 2009).  
The assignment of privileges directly to roles is identified by reviewing the above user 
list that is compiled using generalised audit software (ISACA, 2009).  No exceptions 
should be noted if the recommended practice is followed.  Refer to Table 5.6 item 3. 
 
5.5.3 Implicit database permissions 
 
Risks 
Database permissions are not always necessarily assigned explicitly to end-users and 
roles (ISACA, 2009).  Instead, unintended access and privileges could be assigned 
through implicit privileges (ISACA, 2009).  Such implicit privileges could also result in 
unauthorised access to sensitive data and unauthorised access to delete data or critical 
tables (Davis et al., 2011).   
 
For Oracle Database, implicit privileges typically result from substitute (ANY and 
BECOME) privileges that are assigned to users (ISACA, 2009).  Examples include the 
following:   
 The SELECT ANY TABLE privilege allows the particular user to read any table in the 
database, except the SYS table.  This privilege should be limited to the database 
administrator (Huey, 2016). 
 DROP ANY TABLE allows the users to delete any table in the database (Rahman, 
2014).  
 The BECOME USER privilege allows the designated user to inherit the privileges of 
another user (CIS, 2015). 
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Likewise, user administration rights can also be implicitly granted to non-administrative 
users (ISACA, 2009).  For example:   
 GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE/ROLE/PRIVILEGE enables the grantee to assign 
all objects, privileges or roles to another user (Huey, 2016).   
 Limited user administrator rights are assigned to users with privileges such as WITH 
GRANT OPTION and WITH ADMIN OPTION (ISACA, 2009).  This effectively gives 
the user administrator rights to a particular object or system privilege (i.e. the user is 
able to re-assign that particular privilege to another user) (ISACA, 2009). 
 
Controls 
The principle of least privilege should be applied when assigning permissions that could 
result in unintended system-wide access or user administration rights (Rahman, 2014).  
The documented database standards should describe those high risk permissions that 
should be limited to avoid implicit (substitute and administrator) access that is not required 
(Davis et al., 2011).  Software vendors and standard setters, such as the CIS, publish 
potential implicit access for particular databases (CIS, 2015). 
 
Procedures   
Implicit database permissions cannot be reviewed effectively by using manual traditional 
audit procedures.  Continuous auditing procedures commence with the traditional 
policy and documented standards review, and implicit database permissions are identified 
by reviewing extracts of permission tables (ISACA, 2009).  Extracts are designed to 
identify any users with substitute permissions (refer to Table 5.6 item 4) and implicit 
administrator rights (refer to Table 5.6 item 5) (CIS, 2015).  There should typically be no 
users with such privileges (CIS, 2015).  
 
5.5.4 Row-level access to table data 
 
Risks   
Relational databases are designed to grant permissions to users relating to a database 
table or columns, but are typically not designed to restrict access to a subset of rows in a 
table (Davis et al., 2011).  For example, when granted SELECT privileges in a table, the 
user will be able to read every row in that table.  This could result in unintended wide 
access to view data (ISACA, 2009).   
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Controls 
Several technologies can be used to address this problem.  For example, Oracle offers 
virtual private databases (VPDs) which limit access to specific rows.  Another common 
approach is to use stored procedures to access data; that is, users have access to the 
stored procedure instead of permissions to read the table (Davis et al., 2011).  A stored 
procedure is a collection of SQL statements that perform a particular task or set operations 
to be executed on a database server (ISACA, 2009).  Similar to stored procedures, 
database views can be used to create a tailored view of a subset of data within a table or 
combination of tables (Davis et al., 2011).  The controls should ensure that the user cannot 
access the data in the table, should the user attempt to circumvent the database view or 
stored procedures (Davis et al., 2011).   
 
Procedures 
Davis et al. (2011) proposes that traditional audit procedures commence with a 
discussion with the database administrator to determine whether row-level access is 
applicable, as well as the method of row-level access controls in the database.  Thereafter, 
the auditor should access the database using a similar user account to verify the effective 
ability of that user account (Davis et al., 2011).  As row-level access controls will vary 
among organisations and database instances, depending on the purpose of the database 
and the software application related to the particular database, detailed continuous 
auditing procedures for row-level access have been excluded from this study.   
 
5.5.5 PUBLIC permissions 
 
Risks 
The PUBLIC group is installed by default for most databases and introduces security risks 
if the privileges assigned to this group are not restricted (Rahman, 2014).  Privileges 
granted to the PUBLIC group are typically inherited by all accounts with access to that 
database (Davis et al., 2011).  Many of the built-in procedures and functions in a database 
are granted to the PUBLIC group by default (ISACA, 2009).  As PUBLIC privileges are 
inherited by all other accounts, the PUBLIC role is not highlighted in the DBA_ROLES view 
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Controls 
The database administrator should limit the privileges that are assigned to the PUBLIC 
role (ISACA, 2009).  However, the blind revocation of permissions from the PUBLIC group 
is not recommended, as these permissions may be required to perform certain 
functionalities (Davis et al., 2011).   
 
Procedures 
Except for the review of policies and standards, manual traditional procedures are 
ineffective in reviewing PUBLIC privileges.   
 
Continuous auditing procedures should include the extraction and review all privileges 
assigned to the PUBLIC role, including system and object privileges (Davis et al., 2011).  
This should be done during the system configuration phase.  Any subsequent privilege 
additions to the PUBLIC role should also be detected and reviewed for authorisation in 
terms of the organisation’s change control process (ISACA, 2009).  During the 
configuration phase, the focus is to determine whether all privileges assigned to the 
PUBLIC role are required.  Thereafter, during the maintain phase, the focus is to identify 
any new privileges assigned to the PUBLIC role and to confirm whether the additional 
roles are required and have been authorised (CIS, 2015).  Refer to Table 5.6 item 6.  
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Table 5.6  Continuous audit procedures:  Permissions management 
 
Risk/Control Area 
SQL*Plus query statement or DBA view extracted to 
obtain Oracle configuration 
Procedure relevant to particular product lifecycle phase? 
Configure Operate Maintain 
1. End-user 
privileges 
Join the four DBA views below to compile user list with 
roles and privileges:   
 DBA_SYS_PRIVS 
 ROLE_PRIVS 
 ROLE_ROLE_PRIVS  
 ROLE_TAB_PRIVS 
 
Join the above user list with human resources data to 
associate users with employees and their job function.   
 
Using the above views, identify any roles and/or user 




 TRUNCATE  














Execute the following query to identify users with 
privileged roles such as the database administrator role: 
 
SELECT GRANTEE, GRANTED_ROLE FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS 
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Risk/Control Area 
SQL*Plus query statement or DBA view extracted to 
obtain Oracle configuration 
Procedure relevant to particular product lifecycle phase? 
Configure Operate Maintain 
3. Direct end-user 
access 
The following DBA views should be analysed to identify 





















The following query statements could be used to identify 
users or roles with implicit or substitute privileges: 
 
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS 
WHERE PRIVILEGE = 'SELECT ANY TABLE'   
 
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS 
WHERE PRIVILEGE = 'GRANT ANY X’ AND GRANTEE NOT IN 
('DBA', 'MDSYS', 'SYS', 'IMP_FULL_ DATABASE', 'EXP_FULL_ 
DATABASE', 'DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_ DATABASE', 'WMSYS', 
'SYSTEM','OLAP_DBA', 'DV_ REALM_OWNER') X= OBJECT 
PRIVILEGE, ROLE PRIVILEGE 
 
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS 
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Risk/Control Area 
SQL*Plus query statement or DBA view extracted to 
obtain Oracle configuration 
Procedure relevant to particular product lifecycle phase? 












The following query statements could be used to identify 
users or roles with ADMIN or GRANT privileges: 
 
 SELECT*FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS WHERE ADMIN_ 
OPTION = ‘YES’ 
 

















The following queries list the privileges assigned to the 
PUBLIC group:   
 
 SELECT OWNER, TABLE_NAME, GRANTOR, PRIVELEGE 
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE GRANTEE=’PUBLIC’ 
AND GRANTOR <> ‘SYSTEM’ AND GRANTOR <>’SYS’ 
 











(Sources:  Huey, 2016; ISACA, 2009)  
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5.6 Database auditing and monitoring 
 
Database monitoring is one of the controls that can be implemented by management to 
identify malicious attacks or unauthorised activities in a database (Huey, 2016).  Database 
auditing is typically used to record user activity, and could be used to hold users 
accountable for specific actions (Huey, 2016).  Users (or others such as intruders) may 
also be deterred from unauthorised activities, considering that they can be held 
accountable for their activities (Huey, 2016).  Furthermore, the investigation of suspicious 
activity is aided by detailed audit trails, while management and/or auditors can be notified 
of suspicious or unauthorised activities (Huey, 2016).   
 
International regulations such as the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI 
DSS), the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards:  A 
Revised Framework (Basel II) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 require that access to 
sensitive data be monitored (Huey, 2016).  Therefore, traditional and continuous audit 
procedures should include verifying that database auditing options are enabled, and that 
they are protected and monitored for unauthorised changes.    
 
Database monitoring includes database auditing (logging) as well as automated alerts 
using triggers and stored procedures (Davis et al., 2011).  Monitoring controls are also 
extended to capacity management and performance monitoring (Davis et al., 2011), which 
is excluded from the scope of this study, as it does not relate to the integrity or security, 
but rather to the availability of the database.  
 
Database auditing varies between different products, versions and installations.  This is 
briefly summarised in paragraph 5.6.1, whereafter the audit procedures relevant to 
database auditing are discussed in paragraphs 5.6.2 and 5.6.3.   
 
5.6.1 Types of database auditing  
 
Database auditing is the process of recording and monitoring selected database actions, 
by both database users and non-database users (Dean, 2015).  Information such as the 
event type (e.g. SELECT TABLE) is combined with the event context (such as the event 
time, user name and initiating internet protocol (IP) address) to create an audit trail of 
sensitive transactions (Chaudhari & Bakal, 2015).  For example, an organisation may 
choose to audit every user attempt to view the contents of a particular table (e.g. credit 
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card records) or any attempts (both successful and unsuccessful) to access information in 
the DBA_USERS view (ISACA, 2009).   
 
Database auditing is broadly categorised as mandatory, standard, fine-grained and unified 
(Oracle 12c only) auditing, as shown in Figure 5.3 (Chaudhari & Bakal, 2015).  Each type 
of auditing is described below, while the auditing parameters and storage location of audit 
logs for each type of auditing are depicted in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.3  Types of database auditing 
 
 
(Source:  Dean, 2015) 
 
Mandatory auditing 
Mandatory auditing, which cannot be disabled, records any actions by users with database 
administrator privileges (SYSDBA and SYSOPER), and will also record when the 
database is stopped or started (Dean, 2015; Chaudhari & Bakal, 2015).  Mandatory 
auditing has been extended for Oracle 12c, which now records changes to audit-related 
activities such as creating and altering the audit policies as well as attempts to alter the 
audit trail table (Miller & Kost, 2016).   
 
Standard auditing  
Standard (native) auditing is typically included with most databases and therefore is likely 
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trail parameter and by configuring auditing for specific statements, privileges and objects.  
Standard auditing includes statement, privilege and object auditing (Dean, 2015). 
 Statement auditing enables the broad auditing of SQL statements by type of 
statements, e.g. AUDIT TABLE will log all actions where the TABLE statement was 
used, regardless of which table was accessed (Huey, 2016).  
 Privilege auditing is more focused than statement auditing and logs only a particular 
type of action, e.g. AUDIT CREATE TABLE will log only those actions that entailed 
creating a table (Huey, 2016).  Newer versions of Oracle Database (i.e. 11g and 
later) audit selected events by default, while privilege auditing should specifically be 
configured for older versions (ISACA, 2009). 
 Object auditing is limited to specific statements on a particular schema object, e.g. 
AUDIT SELECT ON EMPLOYEES will log actions where the table containing 
employee details was selected (e.g. viewed or copied) (Huey, 2016).    
 
Fine-grained auditing  
Oracle Database auditing can be customised on a granular level by following a risk-based 
approach (ISACA, 2009).  This is referred to as fine-grained auditing.  Fine-grained 
auditing enables organisations to create policies that define specific conditions that must 
take place for the audit to occur (Dean, 2015).  Fine-grained auditing can be used to 
identify suspicious activity such as the following (Huey, 2016):  
 Accessing a particular table outside standard office hours; 
 Using an IP address from outside the origination’s IP range; 
 Changing a value in a specific table column (e.g. salaries).   
Fine-grained auditing can be combined with event handlers.  For example, when 
suspicious activity is logged as described above, an e-mail alert could be sent to an 
auditor or database administrator to follow up (Huey, 2016).   
 
Unified auditing 
In addition to the above three general auditing types that are typical of most database 
management systems, Oracle 12c introduced a new auditing functionality named unified 
auditing (Dean, 2015).  Unified auditing consolidates all auditing configuration and logs in 
a single location and format (Dean, 2015).  To assist organisations in transitioning to 
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unified auditing, the mixed mode of auditing is enabled by default for Oracle 12c.  In the 
mixed mode, all prior logging and auditing functionalities are available as for prior versions 
of Oracle Database, in addition to the unified audit functionality (Miller & Kost, 2016).  As 
the mixed mode of auditing is installed by default for Oracle 12c and also addresses the 
legacy versions of Oracle Database, this mode of auditing was used to develop continuous 
auditing procedures in this study.   
 
Figure 5.4 depicts the three types of auditing and the location of the audit data for the 
different auditing and logging parameters.  For example, fine grained auditing parameters 
are configured in the DBMA_FGA.add_policy table (Miller & Kost, 2016).  When the mode 
of auditing is selected, audit logs are maintained in both the legacy locations, namely the 
FGA_LOGS database table and the external location specified in AUDIT_FILE_DEST, as 
well as the unified audit trail namely SYS.UNIFIEDAUDIT_TRAIL (Miller & Kost, 2016).   
 
Figure 5.4  Oracle unified auditing – mixed mode 
 
 


















































Location of Audit Data 
Type Parameter OS: Operating System Directory DB:  Database Table KEY 
Auditing and Logging Parameters Type of Auditing 
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5.6.2 Enabling database auditing 
 
Risks   
Database auditing should be enabled to detect unauthorised activities that may occur on 
the database (Dean, 2015).  The auditing strategy and policies are typically determined by 
the organisation following a risk assessment for the particular database (ISACA, 2009).  
The risks related to database auditing include failure to log high-risk events appropriately, 
including unauthorised access and changes to the audit parameters and inadequate 
monitoring of high-risk events (ISACA, 2009).  In particular, the following should be taken 
into consideration:   
 Database auditing is often disabled, as the enabling thereof will increase storage 
space requirements, and may adversely affect the performance of the database 
(ISACA, 2009).   
 Although default audit parameters have been extended in Oracle 12c, these default 
audit parameters may still be disabled by the database administrator (Dean, 2015).  
 The privileged SYS users are exempt from auditing by default.  If this parameter is 
not enabled, critical activities performed by the SYS user are not recorded in the 
audit trail (Miller & Kost, 2016).   
 Unauthorised changes of auditing parameter settings may be processed by 
privileged users who have the ability to change auditing parameter settings (Larner, 
2014).  For instance, the Oracle Database AUDIT SYSTEM privilege allows the user 
to change auditing activities such as disabling the creation of audit trails (CIS, 2015).   
 
Controls 
Organisations should follow a risk-based approach for enabling auditing on any particular 
system (ISACA, 2009).  The approach to database auditing and monitoring should be 
documented in a policy document that should address both database changes and high-
risk actions related to sensitive data (Miller & Kost, 2016).   
 
As changes to auditing parameters may be abused to conceal unauthorised activities, 
access to changing auditing parameters should be restricted to privileged users only 
(Miller & Kost, 2016).  These auditing parameter changes should also be logged as part of 
the audit trail (Miller & Kost, 2016).  Privilege auditing is relevant in this scenario and will 
log all actions where the AUDIT SYSTEM statement was used (Dean, 2015).   
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Database changes introduce the risk of unauthorised changes and include actions such as 
ALTER SYSTEM, data definition language (DDL) statements, using system and object 
privileges, logon and logoff attempts (successful and failed) and any unsuccessful 
operations (Miller & Kost, 2016).  These actions should be described in database policies 
and detailed in database security standards (CIS, 2015).  Actions that entail changing the 
database are audited using the mandatory and standard auditing (statement and object) 
functions described in paragraph 5.6.1 (Miller & Kost, 2016).   
 
Depending on the classification of the data retained in a particular database, auditing 
should be enabled for any data that is confidential or sensitive.  Following a risk 
assessment in consultation with the business owner, those data objects that present the 
greatest risk to the organisation should be identified in this manner (ISACA, 2009).  Such 
data objects may include confidential or regulated information such as salaries, credit card 
numbers, personal information and financial (trading) information (Huey, 2016).  The risk 
assessment requires an in-depth understanding of the data and associated risks and may 
be an area where object auditing and fine-grained auditing may be most appropriate (Miller 
& Kost, 2016).   
 
Procedures   
Both traditional and continuous auditing procedures will commence with a policy and 
standards review process to assess the organisation’s strategy for enabling database 
auditing (ISACA, 2009).   
 
As traditional audit procedures focus on the manual review of parameter settings of the 
database, a similar approach is recommended for continuous auditing procedures.  
Continuous auditing will commence in the configuration phase and should extend to the 
operate and maintain phases to detect any changes to the parameter settings (Cooke, 
2014), as described below:   
 The first audit procedure is aimed at determining whether auditing is enabled.  The 
AUDIT_TRAIL parameter indicates whether auditing is enabled (ISACA, 2009).  
Refer to Table 5.7 item 1.   
 As auditing is not always enabled for default privileged accounts, procedures should 
include checking whether auditing is enabled for the SYS, SYSOPER, SYSDBA and 
DBA accounts (Miller & Kost, 2016).  Refer to Table 5.7 item 2.   
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 As the AUDIT SYSTEM privilege enables the alteration of system audit activities, 
such as disabling the creation of audit trails, this capability should be restricted to 
privileged administrator accounts only (CIS, 2015).  To determine which users can 
change the auditing parameters, the same tables extracted for user account 
management (paragraph 5.4.1) are analysed to determine users with this privilege 
(CIS, 2015). Refer to Table 5.7 item 3.   
 To determine which statements, privileges and objects are audited, the auditor 
should review the database views listed in Table 5.7 items 4 to 6.  The relevant 
database views should be assessed, considering the risks associated with the 
particular database (ISACA, 2009).  Appendix 2 lists the audit queries to confirm 
whether the minimum auditing requirements recommended by CIS (2015) are 
activated for statement, privilege and object auditing.   
 Audit procedures should extend to the fine-grained auditing parameters that are 
configured, depending on the risk assessment for the particular database.  As the 
auditing fine-grained auditing parameters are customised for every organisation and 
database installation (Miller & Kost, 2016), the continuous auditing procedures will 
also vary for each instance.  Therefore, detailed audit procedures for fine-grained 
auditing are not tabled for the purposes of this study.  The procedures for extracting 
the audit parameters and logs are described in Table 5.7 item 7.   
 The auditor should review the audit trails based on the risk assessment for the 
specific database (ISACA, 2009).  The DBA_AUDIT_TRAIL lists all audit entries in 
the AUD$ table and the DBA_FGA_AUDIT_TRAIL lists all audit records related to 
fine-grained auditing (ISACA, 2009).  As the risks and auditing parameters vary 
between organisations and between each database installation, the continuous 
auditing procedures will also vary for each instance.  Therefore, the audit procedures 
for analysing audit trails are not detailed in this study.    
 
5.6.3 Protecting the audit trail 
 
Risks   
As the audit trail may serve as evidence of unauthorised activities, malicious users may 
attempt to modify the audit trail entries to conceal their activities (ISACA, 2009).  Similarly, 
privileged users may temporarily deactivate auditing to avoid the logging of their activities 
(Wright, 2014).   
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Controls 
When auditing for suspicious database activity, the integrity of the audit trail records 
should be protected using access controls to guarantee the accuracy and completeness of 
the auditing information (Larner, 2014).  Any successful and failed attempts to change 
audit configuration settings and content of audit trails should also be logged (CIS, 2015).  
However, system administrators can change audit settings and modify audit trails even 
though the activities of such accounts are also logged (Wright, 2014).  This inherent 
weakness of Oracle Database was addressed in Oracle 12c by the introduction of Oracle 
Vault as well as a separate role (AUDIT_ADMIN) to administer audit policies, and the use 
of AUDIT and NOAUDIT statements (Miller & Kost, 2016).   
 
Procedures   
Both traditional and continuous auditing procedures will commence with a policy and 
standards review process to assess the organisation’s strategy for protecting the audit 
trail.  As the procedures will vary depending on the auditing options implemented by the 
organisation, the following should be tested as a minimum:   
 Determine whether access to the audit trail tables (e.g. SYS.AUD$ and 
SYS.FGA_LOG$) is restricted to trusted users only.  Similarly, confirm that no user 
have access to the table containing password re-set history (CIS, 2015).  
Unauthorised users may manipulate this audit table to conceal their attempts to 
compromise user account passwords (CIS, 2015).  Refer to Table 5.7 item 8.  
 Determine whether all attempts to access or alter the audit trail are logged.  Both 
successful and failed attempts could indicate that the system is under attack (Huey, 
2014).  Refer to Table 5.7 item 9. 
 Ensure that dictionary accessibility is restricted to trusted users only, similar to the 
audit trail (CIS, 2015).  In this manner, only the SYSDBA account is able to use data 
manipulation language (DML) actions to edit the audit trail (Huey, 2014).  Refer to 
Table 5.7 item 10.  
 Detect any interruptions of the audit trail (audit bypass) by comparing the system 
start-up times to any periods where no activities were logged in the audit trail (Wright, 
2014).  Refer to Table 5.7 item 11.   
All of the above procedures relating to the protection of the audit trail will be performed 
during the configuration phase to determine the baseline standard for auditing.  Any 
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changes will be detected by repeating the test during the maintain phase.  Only the 
interruption of the audit trail would be relevant in the operate phase when the database is 
stopped or started.   
 
5.6.4 Stored procedures database triggers 
 
Stored procedures are programs written in Oracle’s extension to the SQL programming 
language, PL/SQL.  These programs are used to package defined business transactions 
and to perform controlled operations on the database using conditional statements (IF-
THEN-ELSE) (ISACA, 2009).  Stored procedures can be invoked by any user or program 
with the EXECUTE privilege (ISACA, 2009).   
 
Database triggers are similar to stored procedures.  The primary difference is that triggers 
are activated when certain conditions are met, instead of being invoked by a user (ISACA, 
2009).  Database administrators can actively monitor the database using triggers.  For 
example, an automated e-mail notification could be created for any unsuccessful attempt 
to access a table with sensitive information (ISACA, 2009).   
 
While Oracle continues support for triggers in later versions (11g and onwards), the use of 
triggers for internal auditing purposes are limited (ISACA, 2009).  In particular, triggers 
cannot be created for SELECT statements (ISACA, 2009).  Furthermore, triggers may 
have a performance impact on the system and should only be used for non-transactional 
tables (ISACA, 2009).   Finally, database triggers are not protected from certain privileged 
users such as the SYS account, which has the ability to disable or change triggers and 
custom audit trail tables (Larner, 2014).   
 
To overcome these limitations, Oracle have implemented fine-grained auditing that 
supports a more granular audit trail and can also actively alert administrators of policy 
violations (ISACA, 2009).  Bearing in mind the above control weaknesses and the better 
alternative offered through the use of fine-grained auditing, database triggers are not 
considered a reliable method to obtain audit evidence, and are therefore excluded from the 
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Table 5.7  Continuous audit procedures:  Database monitoring and auditing 
 
Risk/Control Area 
SQL*Plus query statement or DBA view extracted 
to obtain Oracle configuration 
Procedure relevant to particular product lifecycle phase? 
Configure Operate Maintain 
1. Determine whether 
auditing is enabled 
Extract the setting for the AUDIT_TRAIL parameter 
in the init<SID>.ora file.   
 
Alternative query script: 
SELECT* FROM V$PARAMETER WHERE NAME = 
‘audit_trail’  
 
Auditing is enabled if the result is:   
 DB, EXTENDED or TRUE (stored in AUD$ table),  
 OS (stored in operating system file) or 








2. Determine whether 
auditing is enabled for 
privileged accounts  
(SYS, SYSDBA, SYSOPER, 
DBA)   
Extract the setting of AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS: 
 
SELECT UPPER(VALUE) FROM V$PARAMETER 
WHERE UPPER(NAME) = 'AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS' 
 








3. Determine whether users 
can change the auditing 
parameters 
Extract users with the AUDIT SYSTEM privilege 
which allows changing the auditing activities. 
 
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS 
WHERE PRIVILEGE='AUDIT SYSTEM' AND GRANTEE 
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Risk/Control Area 
SQL*Plus query statement or DBA view extracted 
to obtain Oracle configuration 
Procedure relevant to particular product lifecycle phase? 
Configure Operate Maintain 
4. Review privilege level 
auditing 
The following query result indicates whether 
privilege level auditing is enabled:  
SELECT*FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS 
 









5. Review statement- level 
auditing 
The following query result indicates whether 




Refer to Appendix 2 for a list of recommended 








6. Review object-level 
auditing 
The following query result indicates whether object 




Refer to Appendix 2 for a list of recommended 








7. Fine-grained auditing Fine-grained auditing parameters are stored in 
DBA_AUDIT_POLICIES and logs are retained in the 
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Risk/Control Area 
SQL*Plus query statement or DBA view extracted 
to obtain Oracle configuration 
Procedure relevant to particular product lifecycle phase? 
Configure Operate Maintain 
8. Prevent access to audit 
trail tables 
Where the audit trail parameter is set to DB or 
DB_EXTENDED (refer to Table 5.7 item 2), access to 
the AUD$ table should be tested.  Similarly, access 
to the USER_HISTORY$ table (containing the history 
of password changes) should be tested.   
 
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM 
DBA_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME=‟AUD$‟ 
 










9. Audit all attempts to 
access or alter the audit 
trail (AUD$ table) 
This test is only applicable where the audit trail 
(AUD$) parameter is set to DB or TRUE (refer to 
Table 5.7 item 2) 
 









10. Ensure dictionary 
accessibility is restricted 
Determine whether dictionary accessibility 
initialisation parameters are set to FALSE.  
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Risk/Control Area 
SQL*Plus query statement or DBA view extracted 
to obtain Oracle configuration 
Procedure relevant to particular product lifecycle phase? 
Configure Operate Maintain 
11. Detect interruption of the 
audit trail (audit bypass) 
Any interruptions in the SYS audit trail can be 
detected by matching “quiet times” in the audit 
trail to the database restart times collected 
remotely using this SQL statement: 
 










(Sources:  Huey, 2016; Miller & Kost, 2016; Dean, 2015; CIS, 2015, Wright, 2014)  
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Using the audit planning framework developed in this study (refer to Figure 4.10), 
continuous auditing procedures were developed at an operational level for four of the 
identified control categories for database management systems (depicted in Figure 5.1).  
Using Oracle Database as example, it was demonstrated that continuous auditing 
procedures relating to configuration controls can be evaluated continuously against a 
baseline standard to identify configuration changes and risk indicators. 
 
The proposed continuous auditing procedures are relevant in the configuration phase, 
when determining the baseline standard for configuration controls.  Thereafter, the scripted 
extracts are repeated periodically (or continuously) during the operate and maintain 
phases of the product’s lifecycle.  
 
Although the continuous auditing procedures were developed using Oracle Database as 
example, the same methodology could also be used to develop procedures for other 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
 
King III has emphasised the responsibility of audit committees to ensure that IT risks are 
adequately governed through risk management, monitoring and assurance processes 
(IODSA, 2009).  While the use of technology to improve audit coverage and efficiency is 
recommended by King III, no specific guidance is provided (IODSA, 2009).    
 
In response to this recommendation by King III, the primary objective of this study was to 
develop a generic audit planning framework at a strategic and operational level to assist 
internal auditors in implementing continuous auditing for automated IT controls.  
 
At an operational level, the planning framework is based on the identification of the 
applicable IT architecture components, by identifying all possible access points of an IT 
access path (Boshoff, 1990).  Individual components are analysed to determine the 
baseline standard of controls (IIA, 2015) and the relevant lifecycle phases (Boshoff, 2014).  
When measured continuously against this baseline standard, any subsequent changes in 
configuration settings can be highlighted for further investigation by internal audit (IIA, 
2015).  The generic audit planning framework developed in this study can also be used by 
internal auditors to implement continuous auditing procedures for any IT architecture 
component on an operational level.   
 
The secondary objective of this study was to apply the above framework at an operational 
level for one of the IT access path components, namely database management systems.  
In particular, continuous auditing procedures were developed to provide assurance on the 
validity, integrity and confidentiality of database management systems, using Oracle 
Database as example.  The procedures were designed to be conducted by using 
generalised audit software which is widely used by internal audit functions.  These 
automated audit procedures were developed for the different lifecycle phases for four 
typical control categories for database management systems, namely:   
 Database vulnerabilities;  
 Account and password management;  
 Permissions management; and  
 Database auditing and monitoring.   
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These procedures, which were developed specifically for Oracle Database, can be 
adapted for most commercial database management systems by any organisation that 
adopts this audit methodology, considering the organisational and business process risks.   
 
Since this study focused on detailed continuous auditing procedures for only one 
component of an IT access path, namely database management systems, the remaining 
IT access paths components remain available for further research.  Similarly, advanced 
database security measures, which were excluded from the scope of this review, may also 
be suited to further research on continuous auditing.   
 
By implementing continuous auditing procedures for IT architecture components, internal 
auditors are enabled to report on control failures within a shorter timeframe, potentially 
instantaneously, potentially resulting in real-time assurance (Soileau et al., 2015).  The 
efficiency of such audits is also improved through automation of processes, while audit 
coverage and effectiveness may also increase (IIA, 2015).  Considering that the most 
valuable information assets of organisations are retained in databases and in view of the 
increase in data breaches of high-profile organisations (McAfee, 2015), the implementation 
of continuous auditing for database management systems should be of high priority for 
internal audit functions. 
 
Continuous auditing is a potential solution to address the perceived failure of internal audit 
functions on meeting stakeholder expectations and delivering on future demands (Deloitte, 
2016).  Chief audit executives observed that internal audit functions currently do not have 
the desired impact and influence within the organisation, partially because of skills 
shortages relating to analytics, IT and communications (Deloitte, 2016).   Similarly, internal 
audit’s stakeholders expect forward-looking reports that provide insights regarding risk, 
strategic planning, IT and business performance (Deloitte, 2016).   
 
By investing in continuous auditing methodologies as demonstrated in this study, internal 
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APPENDIX 1 – ACCESS PATH COMPONENTS 
 
The application program code includes the sets of computer programs, control files, 
tables and user interfaces which provide functionality for specific business operations such 
as accounting, payroll and procurement.  The application layer is the component which is 
visible to and accessed by the end-user (Davis et al., 2011).  
 
Database management systems enable the storage, modification, and extraction of data 
(IIA, 2008).  This tool organises and provides access to the data to be used by the 
application, such as Oracle Database, Microsoft SQL Server, DB2 (Davis et al., 2011). 
 
Operating systems perform a computer’s basic tasks, such as managing operator input, 
managing internal computer memory and providing disk drive, display and peripheral 
device functions (e.g. Windows, Linux, UNIX and iOS) (IIA, 2008).    
 
Networks link computers and the system’s users and enable the communication of 
network components, whether across a wire, fibre-optic cable or wireless network (IIA, 
2013b).  The physical network layer includes devices such as firewalls, switches, routers 
and wiring.  Networks also include the programs which control the routing of data packets 
(Davis et al., 2011).   
 
Data centre facilities encompass the physical building and data centre housing the 
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APPENDIX 2 – DATABASE AUDITING PARAMETERS 
 
Statement Auditing  
 
1. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='USER' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL AND 
SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS'  
 
2. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='ALTER USER' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL 
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
3. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='DROP USER' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL 
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS'  
 
4. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='ROLE' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL AND 
SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
5. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='SYSTEM GRANT' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL 
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
6. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='PROFILE' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL AND 
SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
7. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='ALTER PROFILE' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL 
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
8. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='DROP PROFILE' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL 
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
9. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='DATABASE LINK' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS 
NULL AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
10. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='PUBLIC DATABASE LINK' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND 
PROXY_NAME IS NULL AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS'  
 
11. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='PUBLIC SYNONYM' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS 
NULL AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
12. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='SYNONYM' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL AND 
SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS'   
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13. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='GRANT DIRECTORY' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS 
NULL AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
14. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='SELECT ANY DICTIONARY' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND 
PROXY_NAME IS NULL AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
15. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='DROP ANY PROCEDURE' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME 
IS NULL AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
16. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='TRIGGER' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL AND 
SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
17. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='CREATE SESSION' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS 
NULL AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
18. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='PROCEDURE' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL 
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
19. SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
AUDIT_OPTION='ALTER SYSTEM' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL 





20. SELECT PRIVILEGE, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
PRIVILEGE='GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND 
PROXY_NAME IS NULL AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
21. SELECT PRIVILEGE, SUCCESS, FAILURE FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE 
PRIVILEGE='GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE' AND USER_NAME IS NULL AND PROXY_NAME IS 
NULL AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS' AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS' 
 
 
Object Auditing  
 
22. SELECT * FROM DBA_OBJ_AUDIT_OPTS WHERE OBJECT_NAME='AUD$' AND ALT='A/A' 
AND AUD='A/A' AND COM='A/A' AND DEL='A/A' AND GRA='A/A' AND IND='A/A' AND 
INS='A/A' AND LOC='A/A' AND REN='A/A' AND SEL='A/A' AND UPD='A/A' AND FBK='A/A' 
 
 
(Source:  CIS, 2015) 
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